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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
SHORT SELLING: IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
by 
Mohammad Anisur Rahman 
Florida International University, 2018  
Miami, Florida 
Professor Suchismita Mishra, Major Professor 
The literature on short selling documents substantial evidence that short sellers are 
generally informed investors (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Asquith and 
Muelbrook, 1996). This dissertation investigates three specific implications of informed 
short selling for a firm and its investors.  
The first essay investigates if short selling discourages managers from pursuing 
over-optimistic projects by reducing equity market timing. By conditioning short selling 
on firm overvaluation, this essay shows that short selling reduces managerial equity market 
timing and increases leverage. This moderating impact of short selling is more pronounced 
in smaller firms and those with low institutional ownership or higher intangible assets. 
Furthermore, the results show that board independence facilitates the above effect of short 
selling which helps protect shareholder interests. 
The second essay investigates if board independence reduces informed short selling 
prior to earnings announcements. This essay estimates short sellers’ correct prediction of 
the direction of unexpected quarterly earnings through Logistic regression and finds that 
vii 
 
short sellers’ correct prediction decreases in firms with independent boards relative to firms 
with non-independent boards. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced in firms with 
CEO duality and large board size. The quasi-natural experiment using the exogenous shock 
to board independence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, provides further support to 
our hypotheses. 
The third essay provides Sell recommendations by examining pre-announcement 
short selling of firms ahead of their earnings announcements. The methodology makes Sell 
recommendations for firms with the highest short position prior to their quarterly earnings 
announcement. The post-announcement raw, excess, and abnormal returns of firms having 
the Sell recommendations are statistically and economically significant for multiple-
holding periods showing the methodology’s significant trading strategy implication. 
This dissertation significantly contributes to short selling, governance, capital 
structure, and investment literature. 
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CHAPTER 1: SHORT SELLERS AND MANAGERIAL EQUITY MARKET TIMING 
1.1 Introduction 
Existing capital structure studies have documented ample evidence of the 
importance of managerial equity market timing (e.g., Marsh, 1982; Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales, 1998; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002) 
in the management of a firm’s capital structure. The core idea of these studies is that 
managers take advantage of the temporary market and/or firm overvaluation to issue shares 
at higher prices and repurchase shares at lower prices, which eventually affects a firm’s 
capital structure. If firms have a need for external financing to support positive NPV 
projects, then managerial equity market timing may be considered as a rational choice as 
issuing equity is the most cost-effective external financing strategy during overvaluation. 
However, if a firm is overvalued without enough growth projects, which may happen, for 
example, if the market is over-optimistic about the firm because of information asymmetry, 
then this overvaluation can exert pressure on managers to pursue overoptimistic projects 
(Polk and Sapienza, 2009) to support the current price level, and consequently, time the 
equity market. In this case, overvaluation-driven equity market timing may destroy firm 
value. 
Current studies of equity market timing did not draw a distinction between equity 
market timing to support future positive NPV projects and equity market timing to take 
advantage of market sentiment, which may or may not be justified by growth opportunities. 
In this paper, we aim at addressing this gap by examining the implications of overvaluation 
on other market participants (i.e., short sellers) and how this may interact with managerial 
equity market timing. The literature on short selling documents substantial evidence that 
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short sellers are able to identify overvalued firms (e.g., Seneca, 1967; Figlewski, 1981; 
Senchack and Starks, 1993; Asquith and Muelbrook, 1996; Desai et al., 2002). Thus, the 
same temporary episodes of overvaluation that create opportunities for cheap equity 
issuance for managers also offer great opportunities for short selling in anticipation of 
future price decline. With further evidence of short sellers adding to price discovery in the 
financial markets (e.g., Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu, 2007; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 
2008; Boehmer and Wu, 2013; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011), managers may want to 
consider the adverse information embedded in short selling when deciding whether to cater 
to high market sentiment and issue equity by taking advantage of the overvaluation. Thus, 
short sellers may provide important check and balances in managerial equity market timing 
by uncovering important adverse information about future projects, which is the focus of 
this paper. 
Drawing on the above existing empirical evidence that managers may invest in 
over-optimistic projects under overvaluation and that short selling is high if a firm is 
overvalued, we hypothesize that conditioned on overvaluation, short selling will uncover 
adverse information about the firm (e.g. overinvestment in projects), decrease equity 
issuance, and thus will result in an increase in leverage. We test this hypothesis on both 
book and market leverage and document similar results.  
The first challenge in testing our hypothesis is to come up with a reliable measure 
of misvaluation to evaluate firm leverage behavior under overvaluation. Existing literature 
frequently uses market-to-book (MB) (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan and 
Titman, 2007) as a measure of misvaluation. However, MB includes book value, a 
backward-looking measure of the fundamental value of a firm, and therefore, a high MB 
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may reflect market expectations of high growth opportunities or overvaluation or both (see, 
e.g., Hovakimian, 2006; Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012). Therefore, it is difficult to 
test the effects of overvaluation on capital structure based solely on MB (Dong, Hirshleifer, 
and Teoh, 2012). In this paper, we address this issue by adopting an alternative measure of 
misvaluation, value-to-price (VP), where value is a forward-looking measure of the 
fundamental value (V) of a firm based on the residual income model of Ohlson (1995).1  
By including a forward-looking measure instead of the historical book value of equity, VP 
purges growth expectations from market prices reasonably well and provides us with a 
more refined measure of misvaluation than MB. We then use VP to estimate an increase in 
overvaluation and condition an increase in SI on an increase in overvaluation to examine 
the impact of short selling on leverage during overvaluation. Following the convention in 
the short selling literature (Dechow et al., 2001; Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Karpoff 
and Lou, 2010; Henry, Kisgen, and Wu, 2011; Grullon, Michenaud and Weston, 2015), we 
divide a firm’s monthly/bi-monthly short interest (SI) by its total shares outstanding to 
proxy for short selling. We use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to regress leverage on the 
above conditioning variable (an increase in SI conditioned on an increase in overvaluation), 
MB, and the traditional determinants of leverage as identified in past studies (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001; Welch, 
2004; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007).2  The results from estimating 
                                                          
1 Prior literature has implemented the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) to estimate VP to use as a 
measure of misvaluation in both repurchase (D’Mello and Shroff, 2000) and equity issuance (Dong, 
Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012) decisions. 
 
2 We include MB along with VP because the forward-looking fundamental value V may not perfectly capture 
growth opportunities and MB is more heavily weighted toward information about growth opportunities than 
VP. Thus, including both in the model makes the model stringent (see, e.g., Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 
2012). 
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the above model show that book leverage increases by 1.4% when short selling increases 
after an increase in overvaluation.  
The governance literature provides an excellent opportunity to test our hypothesis 
that short selling disciplines the managers, attenuates managerial equity market timing, and 
thereby increases leverage. Specifically, this literature finds that independent directors are 
better at monitoring management (see, e.g., Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010). Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that the impact of short selling will be higher if the firm’s board is independent, 
as independent directors will be more willing to pay attention to short sellers’ opinions than 
dependent directors due to agency problems. To test this hypothesis, we estimate our model 
separately on the subsamples of firms with independent boards and non-independent 
boards. Following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), we classify a board as independent if 
independent directors constitute the majority of the board. The results show that the 
moderating impact of short selling on book leverage is significantly positive among firms 
with independent boards and insignificant among firms with non-independent boards. This 
finding supports the above hypothesis. 
Existing studies document that some firm characteristics increase the likelihood of 
a firm to be overvalued. Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) note that smaller firms are 
harder to value and are subject to an increased likelihood of misvaluation. Many studies on 
short selling (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite, 
1993; Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Hong and Stein, 2003) 
argue and provide empirical support for the idea that stock prices suffer from an upward 
bias in the presence of short selling constraints. Furthermore, high research and 
development (R&D) expenses may indicate good growth prospects. However, because 
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market participants will have differences in opinions, they will also attach different values 
to the prospects of the R&D, leading to an increased likelihood of misvaluation. Given the 
above evidence of how firm size, short selling constraints, and R&D may affect the 
likelihood of misvaluation, we hypothesize that the impact of short selling on leverage will 
be more prominent in smaller firms, in firms with lower institutional ownership (low 
institutional ownership proxying for high short selling constraints), or in firms with higher 
R&D. We estimate our model on Low, Medium, and High measures of Size (firm size), 
R&D, and institutional ownership and find results supporting our above hypothesis. 
Overall, our results suggest that short selling has an offsetting impact on equity market 
timing for overvalued firms, leading to an increase in leverage, and especially so for firms 
with independent boards, smaller firms, firms with lower institutional ownership, and firms 
with more intangible assets. 
Our study makes valuable contributions to multiple strands of literature. Based on 
our literature reviews, this study is the first of its kind to examine equity market timing in 
relation to short selling. Past studies focused only on the managerial incentives to time 
equity market when the firm is overvalued. Our study links the implications of 
overvaluation for other market participants to managerial incentives and shows that equity 
market timing is sensitive to short selling. Thus, our results contribute to a better 
understanding of managerial decision making with respect to external financing. By 
showing that short sellers provide important check and balances in the financial markets 
for proper asset allocation, we add to the short selling literature, particularly to the market-
based monitoring mechanism of short selling. We also add to the governance literature as 
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our results show that board independence strengthens the disciplining impact of short 
selling on managerial market timing.   
1.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
If a firm is overvalued, that is, if the firm does not have enough growth projects to 
justify its valuation, then short sellers, who are considered informed investors, will short 
sell that stock in anticipation of a future decline in price. The adverse information 
embedded in high short selling will discourage managers to pursue overoptimistic projects 
and reduce their issuance of equity which will result in an increase of leverage. This leads 
to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The leverage of an overvalued firm will increase in response to an 
increase in short selling, as short selling attenuates managerial equity market timing. 
The above hypothesis suggests that managers will pay attention to the short sellers’ 
opinions as embedded into the short position and adjust their equity market timing 
accordingly. Governance literature shows that independent directors are better at 
monitoring management (Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010). Therefore, board independence 
should facilitate the incorporation of short sellers’ adverse information into managerial 
decision making, which leads to our second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2. The moderating impact of short selling on managerial equity market 
timing during overvaluation will be more pronounced in firms with independent boards 
than in firms with non-independent boards, as independent directors will be more willing 
to pay attention to short sellers’ opinions than non-independent directors due to lower 
agency problems, leading to a higher increase in leverage. 
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Existing studies document that some firm characteristics (e.g., small firm size, high 
R&D, low institutional ownership) increase the likelihood of a firm to be overvalued. 
Therefore, we also expect that short sellers will actively target the firms with such 
characteristics and the impact of short selling on leverage will be more prominent among 
such firms. Below we discuss this issue thoroughly and form our hypotheses accordingly.  
Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) find that equity issuance increases with firm 
overvaluation. Furthermore, these researchers find that this effect on equity issuance is 
more pronounced in smaller firms because smaller firms are harder to value and are subject 
to an increased likelihood of misvaluation. Many influential studies have examined the 
implications of short selling constraints (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Allen, 
Morris, and Postlewaite, 1993; Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong, 
2003; Hong and Stein, 2003). These studies theorize and provide empirical support to the 
idea that when there are no short selling constraints, pessimistic investors can easily short 
sell securities, counterbalancing optimistic valuation. As a result, stock prices, on average, 
do not suffer significant upward bias. However, when short selling constraints exist, 
pessimistic investors find it difficult to short sell securities, which cause a positive bias in 
stock prices. Some of these studies use institutional ownership to proxy for short selling 
constraints and find that when institutional ownership increases (decreases), short selling 
constraints decrease (increase) (Nagel, 2004; Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002). The presence 
of intangible assets in a firm makes it difficult for the market to value it correctly. For 
example, high research and development expenses (R&D) may indicate good growth 
prospects. However, because market participants will have differences in opinions, they 
will also attach different values to the prospects of R&D, leading to an increased likelihood 
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of overvaluation or undervaluation. In studying the effects of overvalued equity on 
financing decisions, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) document that the effect of 
misvaluation on issuances is stronger among firms with higher proportions of intangible 
assets. Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for misvaluation, Polk and Sapienza (2009) 
find that investment is more sensitive to misvaluation among firms with higher R&D 
intensity. The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3. The moderating impact of short selling on managerial equity market 
timing during overvaluation will be more pronounced in smaller firms, in firms with lower 
institutional ownership (lower institutional ownership proxying for higher short selling 
constraints), or in firms with higher R&D. 
1.3 Data 
For our analysis, we use annual fundamental and monthly/bi-monthly short interest 
data from Supplemental Short Interest File of Compustat.3  We obtain market data from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Short interest data are available only 
from 1973 restricting our initial sample period from 1973 to 2014. We limit our analysis 
to the U.S common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11). We exclude financial services 
firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and regulated utility firms (SIC codes 4900–4999) from our 
sample. Furthermore, following Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Liu (2009), we exclude 
firms with book values of assets smaller than $10 million or book debt-to-book assets ratio 
larger than one. The presence of missing values and use of lagged explanatory variables 
                                                          
3 Beginning in September 2007, member firms of Amex, NASD and NYSE are required to submit short 
interest information twice a month. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 55406 (March 6, 2007), 72 FR 
11071 (March 12, 2007) (order approving SR-NASD-2006-131, SR-NYSE-2006-111, SR-Amex-2007-005). 
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further reduce our sample size, resulting in 50,315 firm-year observations spanning the 
period from 1974 to 2014. For our value-to-price (VP), we use I/B/E/S mean forecasted 
earnings per share (EPS) data, which are available only since January 1979, and thus further 
reduces our final sample size to only 26,270 (book leverage sample) and 26,263 (market 
leverage sample) firm-year observations. 
Following the short selling literature (Dechow et al., 2001; Asquith, Pathak, and 
Ritter, 2005; Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu, 2006; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Henry, 
Kisgen, and Wu, 2011; Grullon, Michenaud and Weston, 2015), we divide a firm’s 
monthly/bi-monthly short interest (SI) by its total shares outstanding to proxy for short 
selling (SI). To capture a greater level of variation and allow more informativeness in short 
selling, we take the average of SI from four months after the fiscal year-end to three months 
prior to the beginning of the next fiscal year and deflate it with the cross-sectional mean of 
SI.  We maintain a gap of four months to match fundamental data as of the fiscal year-end 
to avoid look-ahead bias because it takes approximately four months for the 10-K of most 
firms to be publicly available (see, e.g., Alford, Jones, and Zmijewski, 1994). We also 
maintain a gap of three months prior to next fiscal year-end because a firm is unlikely to 
change its capital structure immediately.  
We perform our analysis on both book leverage and market leverage because 
existing literature adopts book leverage (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999), market 
leverage (e.g., Welch, 2004), and both book and market leverage (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 
2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). We define book leverage as book debt to total assets 
(Compustat item [6]), where book debt is the sum of long-term debt (Compustat item [9]) 
and debt in current liabilities (Compustat item [34]). We define market leverage as book 
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debt divided by the result of total assets minus book equity plus market equity, where 
market equity is defined as common shares outstanding (Compustat item [25]) times price 
(Compustat item [199])4. 
We construct several control variables that past capital structure studies have 
documented as reliable determinants of firm leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001; Welch, 2004; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). These determinants include market-to-book 
ratio (MB) defined as total assets (Compustat item [34]) less book equity (Compustat item 
[144]) plus market equity (defined above), all divided by total assets; property, plant, and 
equipment (PPE) defined as net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item [141]) 
scaled by total assets; profitability (EBITD) defined as operating income before 
depreciation (Compustat item [13]) scaled by total assets; research and development 
expenses (R&D) defined as research and development expenses (Compustat item [46]) 
scaled by net sales (Compustat item [117]); R&DDummy, a dummy variable that is set to  
one if the firm has no R&D expenses, otherwise zero; selling expenses (SE) defined as 
selling expenses (Compustat item [132]) scaled by net sales, and firm size (Size) defined 
as the logarithmic value of net sales.   
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Measure of Overvaluation 
In this paper, our objective is to examine how short selling affects leverage when a firm is 
overvalued. Therefore, an important task for our empirical analysis is to construct a reliable 
                                                          
4 We perform our analysis on several alternative definitions of leverage and note similar results. We discuss 
this analysis in our robustness section.  
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measure of misvaluation which can then be analyzed for overvaluation or undervaluation. 
Existing literature frequently uses market-to-book (MB) to measure misvaluation (see, e.g., 
Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). However, there are non-trivial issues 
in using MB as a measure of misvaluation. MB includes a backward-looking measure of 
the fundamental value of a firm, book value, whereas current market price may reflect both 
misvaluation and growth opportunities. Therefore, a high MB may reflect market 
expectations of high growth opportunities or overvaluation or both (see, e.g., Hovakimian, 
2006; Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012), isolation of which is difficult. Therefore, it is 
difficult to test the effects of overvaluation on capital structure based solely on MB (Dong, 
Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012). However, an estimate of the “true” fundamental value of a 
firm, which incorporates growth opportunities reasonably well, scaled by current market 
price would yield a more refined (less confounded with growth opportunities) measure of 
misvaluation. The residual income model of Ohlson (1995) provides such an estimate of 
“true” fundamental value, also called “intrinsic value” (V). Several past studies rely on this 
methodology to estimate intrinsic value and misvaluation. Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan 
(1999) use the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) to obtain the intrinsic value of the 
30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Frankel and Lee (1998) use it to 
predict  cross-sectional stock returns in the U.S. D’Mello and Shroff (2000) use it to 
estimate misvaluation to examine whether undervaluation affects repurchase decisions. 
Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) use it to examine how equity overvaluation affects 
corporate financing decisions. As in previous research on intrinsic value and misvaluation, 
we also implement the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) to construct a more refined 
measure of misvaluation than MB. 
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We follow Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) and Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh 
(2012) in implementing the residual income model of Ohlson (1995). Ohlson (1995) shows 
that if a firm's earnings and book value follow "clean surplus" accounting, then the intrinsic 
value of a stock is equal to book value plus the discounted value of an infinite sum of 
expected residual incomes.5 Mathematically, intrinsic value (V) can be expressed in the 
following manner: 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + ∑
𝐸𝑡[{𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡}𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1]
[1 + 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡]𝑖
∞
𝑖=1
 
where t indexes time, 𝐸 is the expectations operator, 𝐵 is the book value of equity, ROE is 
the return on equity, and r(e) is the firm’s annualized cost of equity capital. 
The above equation expresses firm value in terms of an infinite series. For practical 
purposes, we adopt a two-stage approach to estimate the intrinsic value: (1) Forecast 
earnings explicitly for the next three years and (2) Estimate the terminal value taking the 
period t+3 residual income as a perpetuity6. Following this two-stage approach, we express 
V as below: 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 +
[{𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1
𝑓 − 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡}𝐵𝑡]
1 + 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡
+
[{𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+2
𝑓 − 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡}𝐵𝑡+1]
[1 + 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡]2
+
𝐸𝑡[{𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+3
𝑓 − 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡}𝐵𝑡+2]
[1 + 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡]2 𝑟(𝑒)𝑡
             
                                                          
5 Clean surplus accounting requires all gains and losses affecting the book value of a stock to be included in 
earnings. This implies that the periodic change in book value is equal to earnings minus dividends. 
 
6 Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) use three different forecast horizons, namely 3, 12, and 18, but 
document that the choice of forecast horizon does not affect the quality of the estimate of the intrinsic value 
(V). 
(1) 
(2) 
13 
 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1
𝑓
 is the forecasted return on equity for period t+1 and the last term discounts 
the period t+3 residual income as a perpetuity. The underlying assumption of the model is 
that the expected residual earnings remain constant after year t+3 so that the discount rate 
for the perpetuity is the firm’s cost of equity capital (see, e.g., Lee, Myers, and 
Swaminathan, 1999; Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2012). Following Dong, Hirshleifer, and 
Teoh (2012), the forecasted ROE is computed as: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑖
𝑓 =
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖
𝑓
?̅?𝑡+𝑖−1
 
where 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖
𝑓
 is I/B/E/S mean forecasted EPS for period t+i and  
?̅?𝑡+𝑖−1 =
𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 + 𝐵𝑡+𝑖−2
2
 
This approach requires forecasting the future value of book equity (for period t+2 
and t+3). We estimate future values of book equity as: 
𝐵𝑡+𝑖 = 𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 + (1 − 𝑘)𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖
𝑓  
where k is the dividend payout ratio computed by dividing actual dividends 
from the last fiscal year by earnings over the same time period. Following Lee, Myers, and 
Swaminathan (1999) and Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012), we implement the following 
additional procedures. First, earnings are assumed to be on average 6% of total assets if k 
is negative due to negative earnings. That is, the amount of dividends paid divided by the 
results of 0.06 times total assets replaces the original estimate of k when k is negative. 
Second, observations where k is greater than one or book value of equity is negative are 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
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simply deleted. Finally, a constant discount rate of 12.5% is used for the firm’s annualized 
cost of equity capital.7  
1.4.2 Empirical Specification 
To examine how short selling affects leverage when the firm is overvalued based 
on the misvaluation measure of VP, we first define two dummy variables: VPDummy and 
SIDummy. VPDummy is coded one if changes in VP (∆VP) are negative, and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, SIDummy is coded one if changes in SI (∆SI) are positive, and zero 
otherwise. Then, we construct an interaction term between the above two dummy variables 
and multiply by ∆SI (INTERACT). Because ∆VP = 1 indicates an increase in overvaluation 
and ∆SI = 1indicates an increase in SI, which is expected when short sellers do not agree 
with the existing valuation, the above interaction term INTERACT captures the impact of 
short selling on firm leverage during times of firm overvaluation, and by multiplying 
INTERACT with ∆SI, we also capture how sensitive leverage is with respect to an increase 
in ∆SI. In our model, we include INTERACT, ∆VP, ∆SI, MB, and several firm 
characteristics following past capital structure studies as discussed in the previous section. 
We include MB in the same model to make our test most stringent, as MB is more heavily 
weighted toward information about growth opportunities than VP, and VP may still contain 
information about growth opportunities because we use analysts’ forecasts only for few 
years ahead in estimating the intrinsic value (V). Following Kayhan and Titman (2007), we 
also control for industry fixed effects. Therefore, our model is:  
                                                          
7 Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) also use Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Fama-French three-
factor model to estimate cost of equity and obtain similar results. 
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𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where t indexes time and i indexes firm; 𝐿 represents leverage; ∆SI is changes in short 
interest; SIDummy is a dummy variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; 
VPDummy is a dummy variable coded one when ∆VP is negative, else zero; INTERACT is 
an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, SIDummy, and ∆SI; X is a vector of firm 
characteristics that affects leverage, including market-to-book (MB), Prop., Plant & Equip. 
(PPE), Profitability (EBITD), Selling Expense (SE), Reseach & Development Expenses 
(R&D), R&DDummy, and firm size (Size). We implement the above model separately for 
book and market leverage because current literature adopts both. As per our hypothesis, 
we expect INTERACT to be positively correlated with leverage (both book and market 
leverage). 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics of our dependent and 
independent variables. We calculate the statistics after winsorizing the variables at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles within each fiscal year to mitigate the impact of outliers. The statistics 
of the variables in our study are very close to the statistics reported in the comparable 
studies. For example, the mean values of BL and Size are 0.21 and 6.78, respectively, which 
compare closely to 0.24 and 5.23, the mean values of leverage and Size, respectively, in 
Hovakimian (2006). Similarly, the mean values of PPE, MB, and EBITD are 0.30, 1.74, 
and 0.14, respectively, which compare closely to 0.32, 1.73, and 0.10, the mean values of 
(6) 
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PPE, MB, and EBITD, respectively, in Liu (2009). The mean value of SI is 0.035 which 
compares well to the mean value of 0.022 for SI in Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu (2011). Panel 
B shows the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients among the variables in our study which 
show that all of the variables are strongly significant in directions consistent with prior 
studies. For example, in consistence with prior studies (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Kayhan 
and Titman, 2007), MB, EBITD, SE, and R&D are all negatively, and PPE and Size are 
positively, correlated with BL and ML. Furthermore, we note that both SI and ∆SI are 
positively correlated with BL and ML. 
1.5.2 Overvaluation and Short Selling 
Our first hypothesis states that the leverage of a firm will increase with an increase 
in short selling conditional on an increase in overvaluation. To test this hypothesis, we 
estimate Eq. (6) where our variable of interest is INTERACT. As per our hypothesis, we 
expect INTERACT to be positively significant. We present the results in Table 1.2 which 
show that INTERACT is positive and strongly significant. The coefficient estimate of 
INTERACT is 0.014 indicating that BL increases by 1.4% following an increase in SI 
conditioned on an increase in firm overvaluation. The strongly significant negative 
coefficient of VPDummy also captures the well-documented evidence of managerial equity 
market timing when a firm is overvalued. Furthermore, the significantly positive 
coefficient estimate of SIDummy indicates that regardless of the direction of the change in 
the past firm valuation (increase or decrease), BL increases as SI increases. By comparing 
the magnitude of the coefficients of SIDummy and INTERACT, it is clear that BL is over 
two times more sensitive (we compute this by dividing the coefficient estimate of 
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INTERACT by the coefficient estimate of SIDummy) to an increase in SI if the increase 
happens subsequent to an increase in firm overvaluation. 
1.5.3 Overvaluation, Short Selling, and Board Independence 
Our hypothesis 2 states that the impact of short selling will be more pronounced in 
firms with independent boards compared to firms with non-independent boards. To test 
this hypothesis, we divide our sample into two subsamples - (1) Firms with non-
independent boards and (2) Firms with independent boards. Following Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999), we classify a board as independent if independent directors constitute a 
majority of the board. Then, we estimate Eq. (6) separately in these two subsamples. Table 
1.3 includes the results which show that INTERACT is significantly positive in firms with 
independent boards and insignificant in firms with non-independent boards.  Furthermore, 
the coefficient estimate of INTERACT in firms with independent boards is higher than in 
the entire sample of firms in Table 1.2 (0.016 vs. 0.014).The insignificant coefficient 
estimate of INTERACT in firms with non-independent boards may indicate that the agency 
costs in poor governance firms (proxied by non-independent boards) may be so high that 
shareholders of these firms do not enjoy the benefits of external market feedback in the 
form of important adverse information embedded in high short position. These results 
support the argument in our second hypothesis. 
1.5.4 Characteristics of Overvalued Firms and the Intensity of Short Selling Impact 
Hypothesis 3 states that the impact of short selling will be more pronounced in 
smaller firms, in firms with low institutional ownership, or in firms with higher R&D. To 
test this hypothesis with respect to firm size, we divide our sample into three equal groups, 
Low, Medium, and High, based on their Size. Following Arnold et al. (2005), we define 
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Size as the logarithmic value of the market value of equity.8 We estimate Eq. (6) in each of 
these subsamples of firms separately and report the results in Table 1.4. The results show 
that the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is positive and strongly significant in each Size 
group; however, the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is the highest in the Low Size 
group. The coefficient estimates of INTERACT are 0.019, 0.009, and 0.01 in Low, Medium, 
and High Size groups, respectively. The coefficient estimate of INTERACT in the smallest 
firms (Low Size group) is almost twice the estimate in the largest (High Size group) firms. 
Therefore, these results suggest that the impact of short selling on BL is stronger in the 
group of smaller firms which is also consistent with the argument in the past studies that 
smaller firms are subject to an increased likelihood of misvaluation. 
To test hypothesis 3 with respect to institutional ownership, we divide the entire 
sample into Low, Medium, and High institutional ownership firms based on the percent of 
institutional ownership. Following existing studies (see, e.g., Nagel, 2004; Dechow et al., 
2001), we define institutional ownership as the total number of shares held by institutions 
divided by the number of shares outstanding measured at the fiscal year-end. We estimate 
Eq. (6) in each of these subsamples of firms separately and report the results in Table 1.5. 
The results show that the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is positive and strongly 
significant in Low and Medium institutional ownership groups and insignificant in High 
institutional ownership group, providing good evidence in support of our hypothesis. The 
coefficient estimates of INTERACT are 0.022, 0.024, and 0.005 in Low, Medium, and High 
institutional ownership groups, respectively. 
                                                          
8 We obtain similar results by using other measures of Size including the logarithmic value of fiscal year-end 
total assets following Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012). 
19 
 
We follow the same process for R&D expenses (R&D). Specifically, we construct 
Low, Medium, and High R&D samples of firms based on R&D, where R&D is defined as 
total research and development expenses divided by net sales. However, given the earlier 
findings that the impact of short selling is more pronounced among smaller firms, we create 
Low, Medium, and High R&D samples from only the High Size firms to avoid the effect 
of R&D to be confounded with the Size effect. We estimate Eq. (6) in each of these 
subsamples of firms separately and present the results in Table 1.6. The results show that 
the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is significantly positive only in High R&D firms. 
Specifically, the coefficient estimate of INTERACT is 0.017 in High R&D firms which is 
larger than the estimate from the entire sample in Table 1.2 (0.014), indicating that the 
short selling impact is driven by firms with high R&D. 
1.6 Robustness 
Existing studies vary in their approaches to define leverage. For example, previous 
studies differ in how they define debt. In our paper, we have defined debt as the sum of 
long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. We do not use total liabilities as items like 
accounts payable are used for transaction purposes rather than for financing (see, e.g., 
Hovakimian 2006; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Leary and Roberts, 2005). However, other 
studies use total liabilities (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002) as debt in their definitions 
of leverage. Therefore, in this section, to check the robustness of our results to alternative 
definitions of leverage, we use total liabilities as debt in both book and market leverage 
and estimate Eq. (6). Table 1.7 includes the results of book leverage which show that 
INTERACT is positive and strongly significant. Furthermore, the estimates are very close 
to what we obtained previously in Table 1.2 (0.013 vs. 0.014).   
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1.7 Conclusion 
Overvalued equity provides an opportunity to raise capital in a cost-effective 
manner. Past studies find evidence that managers tend to issue shares at high prices and 
repurchase shares at low prices (e.g., Marsh, 1982; Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998; 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). However, if an 
overvalued firm issues equity by timing the equity market, then this firm may lose value 
as the new capital will go into sub-optimal projects or stay as excess cash. Drawing on the 
evidence of short selling literature that short sellers are able to identify overvalued firms 
(e.g., Seneca, 1967; Figlewski, 1981; Senchack and Starks, 1993; Asquith and Muelbrook, 
1996; Desai et al., 2002), we hypothesize that short selling, by revealing adverse 
information about future projects, will discourage managers from pursuing over-optimistic 
projects which will reduce equity market timing and increase leverage.  We test this 
hypothesis with a measure of misvaluation based on value-to-price (VP), where value is a 
forward-looking measure of firm fundamental value and therefore, control for the growth 
effects reasonably well and isolate the effects of overvaluation. The results show that 
leverage increases in response to an increase in short selling conditional on an increase in 
overvaluation, as our hypothesis suggests. This moderating effect of short selling is 
significantly positive among firms with independent boards and insignificant among firms 
with non-independent boards, which suggests that board independence facilitates the 
incorporation of short sellers’ important adverse information in managerial decision 
making. In consistence with existing studies that firm size, R&D expenses, and short-
selling constraints can affect the likelihood of equity misvaluation, our results further show 
that the moderating effect of short selling is more pronounced in smaller firms, in firms 
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with lower institutional ownership, and in firms with higher R&D. Overall, these results 
suggest that short selling has an offsetting impact on equity market timing for overvalued 
firms, leading to an increase in leverage. These results do not depend on the definitions of 
leverage. 
Our study examines managerial financing decisions in the presence of short sellers. 
The results of our study contribute to a better understanding of corporate financing 
decisions and hold implications for policy makers, managers, shareholders, and academics. 
The findings that short selling reduces equity market timing of an overvalued firm and thus 
potentially reduces investment in suboptimal projects indicate important check and 
balances in the financial markets coming from short selling. Policymakers should consider 
this market-based disciplinary mechanism of short selling while evaluating any existing or 
future regulations affecting short selling. The results of this study are particularly important 
for managers. The results support the argument that high short selling is embedded with 
important adverse information about firm prospects and that it is important for managers 
to incorporate this information into their decision making. This study also encourages 
shareholders to ensure an independent board so that the important adverse information 
coming from short selling is effectively incorporated into management decision making. 
Finally, the interesting results of this study are expected to motivate further academic 
research linking capital structure to other branches of literature including short selling and 
governance. 
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent variables, and 
Panel B shows the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients. BL is book leverage; ML is market 
leverage; SI is the short interest; ∆SI is changes in short interest; VP is value-to-price; MB 
is market-to-book ratio; PPE is property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before 
interest, taxes, and depreciation; SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development 
expenses, and Size is firm size. The Appendix includes the detailed definitions of all these 
variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP. The sample period is from the 
fiscal year 1974 to 2014 and contains 26,270 firm-year observations. Statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
  Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25 P 50 P 75 P 
BL       0.213        0.168        0.068        0.202        0.319  
ML       0.162        0.152        0.036        0.130        0.243  
SI       0.035        0.048        0.004        0.017        0.046  
∆SI      (0.018)       1.045       (0.247)      (0.007)       0.208  
VP       0.495        0.498        0.244        0.456        0.662  
MB       1.735        1.009        1.108        1.428        2.001  
PPE       0.299        0.218        0.129        0.250        0.417  
EBITD       0.137        0.095        0.090        0.136        0.187  
SE       0.243        0.217        0.115        0.201        0.317  
R & D       0.041        0.336             -          0.003        0.035  
Size       6.775        1.655        5.607        6.717        7.880  
 
Panel B: Pearson’s Correlation 
  BL   ML   SI   ∆SI   VP   MB   PPE   EBIT
D 
  
ML 0.89 ***                             
SI 0.08 *** 0.08 ***                         
∆SI 0.02 *** 0.01 ** 0.35 ***                     
VP 0.12 *** 0.19 *** -0.01 ** 0.01 **                 
MB -0.23 *** -0.40 *** 0.07 *** 0.01   -0.21 ***             
PPE 0.31 *** 0.29 *** 0.00   0.00   0.01 * -0.13 ***         
EBITD -0.04 *** -0.15 *** -0.01   0.03 *** 0.07 *** 0.36 *** 0.19 ***     
SE -0.21 *** -0.24 *** 0.03 *** -0.01   -0.19 *** 0.25 *** -0.32 *** -0.35 *** 
R&D -0.07 *** -0.07 *** 0.02 *** 0.00   -0.08 *** 0.08 *** -0.09 *** -0.21 *** 
Size 0.21 *** 0.10 *** 0.04 *** 0.00   0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.11 *** 0.27 *** 
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Table 1.2 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage  
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage on various explanatory variables. 
BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable coded one when 
changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest; SIDummy is a dummy 
variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the market-to-book ratio; 
INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is the 
property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation; 
SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; R&DDummy is a 
dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero, and Size is firm 
size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. t- Statistics are reported in 
brackets. Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and 
∗, respectively. 
 
Explanatory Variables BL 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 0.014 
 [5.14]*** 
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.002 
 [-2.15]** 
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.006 
 [3.85]*** 
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.007 
 [-3.52]*** 
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.017 
 [-7.61]*** 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 0.145 
 [7.24]*** 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.233 
 [-8.98]*** 
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.057 
 [-4.06]*** 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 0.002 
 [0.75] 
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.021 
 [2.80]*** 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.021 
 [8.05]*** 
Constant 0.100 
 [5.49]*** 
  
Observations 26,270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.351 
Industry FE YES 
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Table 1.3 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage and Board Independence 
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage on various explanatory variables. 
BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable coded one when 
changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest; SIDummy is a dummy 
variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the market-to-book ratio; 
INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is the 
property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation; 
SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; R&DDummy is a 
dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero, and Size is firm 
size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. t- Statistics are reported in 
brackets. Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and 
∗, respectively. 
 
Explanatory Dependent Variable: BL 
Variables Non-Independent Board Independent Board 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.015 0.016 
 [-1.15] [2.83]*** 
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 0.007 -0.002 
 [1.99]** [-0.75] 
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.000 0.011 
 [0.01] [4.26]*** 
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.007 -0.007 
 [-1.07] [-2.82]*** 
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.015 -0.015 
 [-1.60] [-4.85]*** 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 0.112 0.110 
 [1.68]* [3.47]*** 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.320 -0.172 
 [-2.39]** [-3.70]*** 
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.182 -0.015 
 [-1.51] [-0.39] 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.354 -0.019 
 [-0.96] [-0.97] 
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.022 0.024 
 [0.90] [1.89]* 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.022 0.020 
 [1.71]* [4.66]*** 
Constant 0.083 0.045 
 [0.80] [1.38] 
   
Observations 1,331 10,214 
Adjusted R-squared 0.619 0.402 
Industry FE YES YES 
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Table 1.4 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage and Firm Size 
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage in Low, Medium, and High firm 
size groups. BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable 
coded one when changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest; 
SIDummy is a dummy variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the market-
to-book ratio; INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; 
PPE is the property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation; SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; 
R&DDummy is a dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero, 
and Size is firm size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. Two-sided 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
 
Explanatory Dependent Variable: BL 
Variables Low Medium High 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 0.019 0.009 0.010 
 [2.58]** [3.10]*** [2.08]** 
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 [-0.64] [-1.17] [-1.22] 
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001 0.011 0.009 
 [0.30] [3.25]*** [4.24]*** 
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.004 -0.010 -0.006 
 [-0.97] [-3.68]*** [-2.51]** 
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.025 -0.020 -0.006 
 [-5.05]*** [-5.08]*** [-2.40]** 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 0.235 0.152 0.074 
 [5.71]*** [4.76]*** [2.86]*** 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.062 -0.276 -0.373 
 [-1.82]* [-6.30]*** [-9.90]*** 
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 0.002 -0.034 -0.013 
 [0.12] [-1.51] [-0.27] 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 0.004 0.001 -0.045 
 [2.03]** [0.32] [-1.00] 
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.009 0.018 0.015 
 [0.64] [1.72]* [1.34] 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.043 0.038 0.016 
 [8.20]*** [8.72]*** [3.17]*** 
Constant 0.092 0.030 0.067 
 [2.87]*** [0.91] [1.24] 
    
Observations 6,275 9,322 10,672 
Adjusted R-squared 0.466 0.430 0.387 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
 
26 
 
Table 1.5 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage and Institutional Ownership  
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage in Low, Medium, and High 
institutional ownership firms. BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a 
dummy variable coded one when changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in 
short interest; SIDummy is a dummy variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; 
MB is the market-to-book ratio; INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, 
∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is the property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before 
interest, taxes, and depreciation; SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development 
expenses; R&DDummy is a dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, 
else zero, and Size is firm size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. 
Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, 
respectively. 
 
Explanatory Dependent Variable: BL 
Variables Low Medium High 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 0.022 0.024 0.005 
 [3.50]*** [4.66]*** [1.09] 
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.006 -0.005 0.005 
 [-2.06]** [-2.34]** [2.85]*** 
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001 0.006 0.006 
 [0.20] [1.85]* [2.06]** 
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 
 [-1.54] [-2.62]*** [-1.85]* 
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.021 -0.018 -0.014 
 [-6.89]*** [-5.67]*** [-3.34]*** 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 0.213 0.142 0.098 
 [6.35]*** [4.63]*** [3.07]*** 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.193 -0.206 -0.254 
 [-5.20]*** [-5.59]*** [-5.42]*** 
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.041 -0.042 -0.062 
 [-1.81]* [-2.66]*** [-1.74]* 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 0.010 -0.001 -0.001 
 [2.59]*** [-0.41] [-0.15] 
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.016 0.031 0.019 
 [1.01] [3.13]*** [1.71]* 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.029 0.023 0.015 
 [9.87]*** [5.56]*** [3.61]*** 
Constant 0.139 0.036 0.120 
 [5.89]*** [1.26] [3.06]*** 
    
Observations 6,072 8,907 9,180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.474 0.399 0.399 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
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Table 1.6 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage and R&D 
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage in Low, Medium, and High R&D 
firms. BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable coded 
one when changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest; SIDummy 
is a dummy variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the market-to-book 
ratio; INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is 
the property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation; 
SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; R&DDummy is a 
dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero, and Size is firm 
size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. Two-sided statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
 
Explanatory Dependent Variable: BL 
Variables Low Medium High 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 0.006 0.019 0.017 
 [1.07] [1.57] [1.99]** 
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.004 -0.005 0.000 
 [-1.54] [-1.08] [0.03] 
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.016 0.006 0.005 
 [4.41]*** [1.66]* [1.23] 
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.012 -0.008 -0.001 
 [-3.45]*** [-2.01]** [-0.35] 
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.004 0.018 -0.010 
 [-1.05] [1.96]* [-3.16]*** 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 0.117 0.019 0.036 
 [2.88]*** [0.30] [0.92] 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.417 -0.490 -0.305 
 [-9.11]*** [-5.81]*** [-3.73]*** 
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 0.003 0.216 -0.097 
 [0.06] [1.92]* [-1.06] 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 35.748 1.663 0.053 
 [13.15]*** [1.21] [1.28] 
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.129 0.044  
 [4.93]*** [0.48]  
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.014 0.021 0.013 
 [1.68]* [2.30]** [2.03]** 
Constant 0.175 0.041 0.113 
 [2.45]** [0.53] [1.37] 
    
Observations 4,354 2,430 3,888 
Adjusted R-squared 0.494 0.419 0.298 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
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Table 1.7 Impact of Short Selling on Book Leverage (Total Liabilities) 
This table shows the results of regressing book leverage on various explanatory variables. 
BL is book leverage; VP is value-to-price; VPDummy is a dummy variable coded one when 
changes in VP is negative, else zero; ∆SI is changes in short interest; SIDummy is a dummy 
variable coded one when ∆SI is positive, else zero; MB is the market-to-book ratio; 
INTERACT is an interaction term among ∆VPDummy, ∆SIDummy, and ∆SI; PPE is the 
property, plant & equipment; EBITD is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation; 
SE is selling expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; R&DDummy is a 
dummy variable coded one if the firm has no R&D expenses, else zero, and Size is firm 
size. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1974 to 2014. Two-sided statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
 
Explanatory Variables BL 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 0.013 
 [5.31]*** 
∆𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.001 
 [-1.10] 
𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.004 
 [2.21]** 
𝑉𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.009 
 [-4.79]*** 
𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.010 
 [-3.61]*** 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 0.132 
 [5.55]*** 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.406 
 [-13.27]*** 
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.059 
 [-3.22]*** 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 0.012 
 [2.25]** 
𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.003 
 [-0.36] 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.045 
 [14.91]*** 
Constant 0.237 
 [11.08]*** 
  
Observations 26,270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.398 
Industry FE YES 
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CHAPTER 2: DOES BOARD INDEPENDENCE REDUCE INFORMED SHORT 
SELLING PRIOR TO EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS? 
2.1 Introduction 
Short sellers are considered sophisticated investors. Financial theory suggests that 
short positions should bear a negative relation with stock returns (e.g., Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1987). Empirically, the prior literature provides ample evidence that short 
sellers are generally successful in identifying securities that underperform the market 
(Asquith and Meulbroek, 1996; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 2002). 
Past studies also document evidence that short sellers use information in various predictor 
variables when taking short positions (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001; 
Drake, Rees, and Swanson, 2011). Other studies argue that short sellers’ ability in 
identifying stocks that underperform in the future can be partially attributed to their 
possession of private information. For example, Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) 
examine short selling prior to earnings announcements of Nasdaq-listed firms and show 
that the pre-announcement short selling mostly appears to be driven by information specific 
to the upcoming announcements of the individual firms. Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012) 
investigate the relation between organization structure and the information content of short 
sales and find that the informed trading via short sales occurs more readily in family firms 
than in nonfamily firms. These researchers argue that family owners have access to 
privileged information and may seek to earn profits in light of adverse information. 
Alternatively, family firms may have a variety of linkages that could facilitate the leakage 
of material nonpublic information leading to informed trading prior to earnings 
announcements.  
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In light of the above substantial evidence that short sellers are informed traders, and 
may use privately acquired information in selling short prior to earnings announcement 
events, an obvious question arises about the effectiveness of corporate boards in protecting 
the shareholders from the exploitation of short sellers around these events through their 
access to nonpublic information9. Specifically, the board of directors has the fiduciary 
responsibility to uphold the best interests of the shareholders which requires maintaining 
an effective information environment surrounding important corporate events like earnings 
announcements so that informed traders cannot make abnormal returns at the expense of 
uninformed traders by trading with nonpublic information.  Therefore, it is important to 
examine how corporate boards are impacting short selling behavior driven by possession 
of nonpublic information which is the focus of this study. With the evidence that 
independent directors are effective monitors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; 
Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; Byrd and Hickman, 1992), in this paper, we argue that access 
to nonpublic information will be limited in firms with independent boards which will 
reduce informed short selling prior to upcoming earnings announcements. Existing 
literature suggests that board leadership structure may affect the value of board’s 
monitoring activities. For example, Desai, Kroll, and Wright (2003) note that shareholders 
benefit from the monitoring by independent directors in the presence of CEO duality (when 
the titles of both the CEO and the Chairman of the Board are assigned to the same 
                                                          
9 Some studies have referred to information not reflected in publicly available data as private information 
(Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004; Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao, 2012). However, we choose to use nonpublic 
over private for two reasons; (1) it may be very difficult to isolate private information by a limited set of 
control variables and (2) short sellers conduct extensive research on firms they target. Therefore, they may 
have access to some information which is not necessarily obtained through private channels but possibly 
through their research. Hence, the nonpublic information in this paper refers to information that is available 
to short sellers either because they have superior research ability or access to private channels. 
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individual). Therefore, our second hypothesis argues that board independence is more 
effective in limiting informed short selling in the presence of CEO duality. Finally, because 
board size can affect the effectiveness of board’s monitoring activities, favorably or 
unfavorably, our third hypothesis argues that the value of board independence in limiting 
informed short selling varies with board size.  
In this paper, we are interested in examining informed short selling based on 
nonpublic information. Therefore, we first estimate measures of abnormal short selling 
(ABSI) and unexpected quarterly earnings (UQE). We estimate ABSI prior to earnings 
announcements following Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) and estimate UQE, which 
cannot be readily attributed to publicly available information, following Anderson, Reeb, 
and Zhao (2012). To measure informed short selling, we construct a dummy variable 
Prediction, which is coded one when ABSI is positive and UQE is negative, and zero 
otherwise, and thus captures when short sellers trade in the right direction relative to 
movement of UQE post-announcement. Following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), we 
construct a dummy variable IndependentBoards, which is coded one if independent 
directors constitute a majority of the board and zero otherwise. We employ Logistic model 
to regress Prediction on IndependentBoards after controlling for UQE and several control 
variables that past literature finds to be reliable determinants of short selling. The results 
show that the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant, which 
suggests that informed short selling decreases in firms with independent boards relative to 
firms with non-independent boards, providing support for our first hypothesis. More 
specifically, the exponentiated coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards, 𝑒−0.185 = 0.83, 
suggests that the predicted odds of correctly predicting the movement of UQE post-
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announcement in firms with independent boards is 0.83 times that in firms with non-
independent boards. To evaluate our second hypothesis, we divide our sample into two 
subsamples; (1) one subsample includes the observations with CEO duality (2) the other 
subsample includes the observations without CEO duality. The results from estimating our 
model in the above two subsamples separately show that the coefficient estimate of 
IndependentBoards is negative and significant where CEO duality is present and 
insignificant where CEO duality is absent, providing support for our second hypothesis. In 
the subsample of firms with CEO duality, the exponentiated coefficient estimate of 
IndependentBoards, 𝑒−0.292 = 0.74, suggests that the predicted odds of correctly 
predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement in firms with independent boards is 
0.74 times that in firms with non-independent boards. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards in the subsample with CEO duality is larger 
than that in the entire sample (-0.292 versus -0.185). We evaluate our third hypothesis by 
estimating our model separately in two subsamples constructed based on board size; (1) 
one subsample includes the observations where the board size is small (2) the other 
subsample includes the observations where the board size is large. We define board size as 
small if the size of a board is less than the median board size and large, otherwise. The 
results show that the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant 
in firms with large boards and insignificant in firms with small board, suggesting that board 
independence is more effective in large boards to limit informed short selling prior to 
earnings announcement. In the subsample of firms with large boards, the exponentiated 
coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards, 𝑒−0.343 = 0.71, means that the predicted odds 
of correctly predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement in firms with 
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independent boards is 0.71 times that in firms with non-independent boards.  Furthermore, 
the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards in the subsample with 
large board is almost twice that in the entire sample (-0.343 versus -0.185). 
In our analysis, we have used a set of well known control variables that affect short 
selling to examine how board independence affects informed short selling. However, the 
board of directors is determined endogenously and the above documented negative 
relationship between Prediction and IndependentBoards may be driven by unobservable 
variables affecting both short selling and board independence. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX, hereafter) provides us an excellent opportunity to deal with this issue by 
introducing an exogenous shock to the extent of representation of independent directors in 
corporate boards (see e.g., Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010).  
Our analysis shows that informed short selling significantly decreased in firms where the 
independent directors constituted the majority of the boards after the shock. More 
specifically, the exponentiated coefficient estimate of Treatment * PostSOX, an interaction 
term between Treatment and PostSOX identifing the firms where independent directors 
constituted the majority of the boards after the shock, 𝑒−0.483 = 0.62, means that the 
predicted odds of correctly predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement after the 
shock is 0.62 times that before the shock. These results provide reasonable evidence for 
our central prediction that independent directors limit informed short selling prior to 
upcoming earnings announcements. 
Our study contributes to both governance and short selling literature by examining 
one of the most important aspects of corporate governance – board independence—within 
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the context of short selling. On one hand, past governance studies have thoroughly 
examined the relations of board independence with firm value (e.g., Nguyen and Nielsen, 
2010), monitoring (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983), agency problems (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; 
Byrd and Hickman, 1992), etc. On the other hand, short selling literature has extensively 
studied the firm fundamental information (e.g., book-to-market ratio, etc.) that short sellers 
consider prior to short selling. However, we have not found any studies that directly 
examine if short sellers consider governance-related information, specifically, board 
independence, prior to short selling. Thus, our paper contributes to addressing a gap in the 
current literature. The results of our studies have implications for policymakers in their 
attempt at maintaining transparent financial markets. We also expect our study to lead to 
future research in this area which will help gain a better understanding of governance and 
short selling.   
2.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) show that short selling prior to quarterly 
earnings announcements tends to be driven by information specific to those upcoming 
announcements of the individual firms. In examining the relations between organization 
structure and the information content of short sales, Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012) find 
that family-controlled firms, which may have a variety of linkages that could facilitate the 
leakage of material, nonpublic information, are more exposed to informed trading via short 
sales. This evidence suggests that some short selling may be driven by possession of 
nonpublic information and can adversely affect the shareholders of the firm concerned. 
However, an effective corporate governance mechanism is supposed to maintain good 
information environment by managing the flow of information from the firm which should 
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reduce access to nonpublic information to outsiders such as short sellers. Existing studies 
suggest that the presence of independent directors in corporate boards contribute to 
effective governance mechanism through their better monitoring of management, 
expertise, etc. For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that most independent directors 
are managers or decision makers at other organizations and they use their directorships to 
signal their value to the market. Therefore, they have good incentives to provide good 
monitoring of the management and establish their reputations. Subsequent studies also 
provide substantial evidence that independent directors are better monitors of management. 
For example, Weisbach (1988) find that CEO resignations for poor performance are more 
likely in companies with outsider-dominated boards than for companies with insider-
dominated boards. Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that independent directors monitor firm 
decisions on behalf of shareholders during acquisition process. Alleviating the endogeneity 
concerns related to appointment and composition of the board of directors, Nguyen and 
Nielsen (2010) examines stock price reactions to sudden deaths of directors and note that 
following director death stock prices drop by 0.85% on average, suggesting that 
independent directors provide a valuable service to shareholders. The above evidence leads 
to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.  Independent directors limit informed short selling prior to upcoming 
earnings announcements. 
Board leadership structure may affect the value of board’s monitoring activities. 
One aspect of board leadership structure that has gained immense attention in the 
governance literature is the assigning of the titles of both the CEO and the Chairman of the 
36 
 
Board to the same individual, an issue commonly referred to as CEO duality. For example, 
Jensen (1993) argues that the CEO cannot perform the critical functions of the Chairman, 
which include overseeing the process of hiring, compensating, evaluating, and firing of the 
CEO, without personal interest. In consistence with this argument, Desai, Kroll, and Wright 
(2003) note that shareholders benefit from the monitoring by independent directors in the 
presence of CEO duality. Specifically, they find that the percentage of independent 
directors are positively related to firms’ acquisition performance in the presence of CEO 
duality and negatively related in the absence of CEO duality. This leads to our second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.  The value of board independence in limiting informed short selling 
is more pronounced in firms with CEO duality. 
Existing studies argue that board size affect board’s monitoring activities and thus, 
the information environment. However, these studies provide opposite arguments and 
evidence. For example, Klein (2002) find that audit committee independence and board 
size are positively correlated. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) argue that larger boards 
may increase the level of managerial monitoring and enhance the financial accounting 
process. However, studies arguing for smaller boards point to the potential difficulties in 
ensuring the quality of board’s monitoring of the management, particularly, of the CEO, in 
a large board. For example, Jensen (1993) argue that it is easy for the CEO to take control 
of a large board. Yermack (1995) documents an inverse relationship between board size 
and firm value and suggests that small boards of directors are more effective. This leads to 
our third hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3.  The value of board independence in limiting informed short selling 
varies with board size. 
2.3 Data 
For our analysis, we use monthly/bi-monthly short interest data and quarterly 
fundamental data from Compustat, and market data including price, returns, trading 
volume, etc. from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and director 
characteristics data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Our sample spans from 
1996 to 2014 but excludes 2007 through 2009 to remove financial crisis period. We limit 
our analysis to the U.S common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11). We also exclude 
financial services firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and regulated utility firms (SIC codes 
4900–4999) from our analysis, which finally gives us a sample of 11,303 firm-quarter 
observations. 
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Measure of Unexpected Quarterly Earnings (UQE) 
  In this paper, we hypothesize that short seller’s ability to correctly predict quarterly 
earnings will be reduced in firms with independent directors. Our hypothesis is based on 
the argument that independent directors maintain good information environment which 
limits access to nonpublic information by the outsiders, such as short sellers, around 
earnings announcements. Because we are focusing on short selling based on nonpublic 
information, we first estimate earnings surprises (positive or negative) which cannot be 
attributed to publicly available information. Following Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012), 
we obtain unexpected quarterly earnings (UQE) for each firm as the residual from the 
following regression:  
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𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−4 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−8 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑞 
where i indexes firms; EPS is actual earnings per share of the announcement quarter (q), 
the prior quarter (q-1), one year ago (q-4), and two years ago (q-8). 
2.4.2 Measure of Abnormal Short Interest (ABSI) 
Because we are interested in short selling driven by nonpublic information about 
upcoming earnings announcements, we focus on abnormal short selling prior to earnings 
announcements defined as pre-announcement short selling divided by non-announcement 
short selling, all minus 1. Following Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004), we define pre-
announcement short selling as shares sold short during the five days preceding the earnings 
announcement and non-announcement short selling as the average shares sold short during 
the 57 days prior to the five days of the pre-announcement period. Furthermore, following 
the convention in short selling literature (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001; 
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Henry, Kisgen, and Wu, 2011; 
Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston, 2015), we divide a firm’s monthly/bi-monthly short 
interest (SI) by its total shares outstanding to proxy for short selling. Therefore, our 
measure of abnormal short interest (ABSI) is expressed as below: 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1) =
𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1)
𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−62 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−6)
− 1 
where t indicates the date of earnings announcement for the firm i. 
2.4.3 Measure of Informed Short Selling 
In this section, we develop a measure of informed short selling prior to earnings 
announcements. We construct a dummy variable, Prediction, that captures the movement 
of ABSI relative to the movement of UQE. If short sellers are able to predict negative UQE, 
(1) 
(2) 
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then we expect short selling to increase prior to announcements which imply a positive 
ABSI. Therefore, our measure of correct prediction, Prediction, is coded one when ABSI is 
positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we construct another 
dummy variable IndependentBoards, which is coded one if independent directors 
constitute a majority of the board and zero otherwise. As per our hypothesis, we expect 
Prediction to be negatively correlated with IndependentBoards. 
2.4.4 Model Specification and Estimation Procedure 
To evaluate our hypothesis, we regress Prediction on IndependentBoards after 
controlling for UQE and several control variables that past literature finds to be reliable 
determinants of short selling.  For example, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2008) show that 
short selling tends to be higher for large-cap stocks and high market-to-book ratio. So, we 
control for firm size (Size), defined as the natural log of quarter-end total assets (Anderson, 
Reeb, and Zhao, 2012), and market-to-book (MB) ratio, defined as the product of shares 
outstanding and price divided by the book value of total common equity (Dechow, Hutton, 
Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001). Less liquid stocks can be costly for short-sellers (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). So, we control for liquidity (Liquidity) with trading volume measured 
as the natural logarithmic value of the daily trading volume averaged across all trading 
days in the quarter (Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao, 2012). To control for the short selling 
driven by information in transaction data, we use bid-ask spread (Spread), defined as the 
daily bid price less the daily ask price, divided by the average of the bid price plus the ask 
price (Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao, 2012). Figlewski (1981) shows that short interest is 
correlated with the diversity of beliefs. Following Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012), we 
control for the diversity of beliefs with the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided 
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by the previous quarter-end stock price (Dispersion) and with the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns (Vol). Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012) document that stocks listed on 
NYSE exhibit less abnormal short sales than stocks listed on other exchanges. Therefore, 
we include two dummy variables NasdaqDummy and AmexDummy. NasdaqDummy is 
coded one for stocks listed on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. 
AmexDummy is coded one for stocks listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero 
otherwise. Furthermore, we include dummy variables for each of 48 Fama–French industry 
to account for industry effects as well as quarter dummy variables to capture time effects 
resulting in the below model: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1)
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑄𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛿1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿1𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where t indexes time and i indexes firm; Prediction and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠  are as 
defined in the previous section; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; IndustryDummy are 
dummy variables for each of 48 Fama–French industry classifications; QuarterDummy are 
dummy variables for each calendar quarter; X is a vector of firm characteristics that affect 
short selling, which includes market-to-book (MB), firm performance (Performance), stock 
return volatility (Vol), share turnover (Liquidity), bid-ask spread (Spread), and dummy 
variables for stocks listed on the American Stock Exchange (AmexDummy) and on Nasdaq 
Stock Market (NasdaqDummy).  
In this paper, our objective is to assess whether informed short selling is related to 
board independence. We construct a dummy variable to measure informed short selling 
(3) 
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which is used as the dependent variable. Therefore, we choose an estimation method that 
allows for this dummy variable as the dependent variable. We omit usual regression 
analysis, including linear probability model, because linear functions are inherently 
unbounded but probabilities are bounded by zero and one. We choose Logistic regression 
because it solves the problems associated with bounded dependent variable. Logistic 
regression removes the upper bound by transforming the probability into odds ratio and 
removes the lower bound by taking the natural logarithmic value of the odds ratio. 
2.4.5 Endogeneity 
In the previous section, we have used a set of well known control variables that 
affect short selling. However, the board of directors is determined endogenously and 
relations between Prediction and IndependentBoards may be driven by unobservable 
variables affecting both short selling and board independence. Therefore, we test our 
hypothesis by focusing on an exogenous shock to board independence. In particular, we 
focus on the exogenous shock to corporate governance environment from the passage of 
SOX, which, among other things, has increased representation of independent directors on 
corporate boards (e.g., Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010).  We 
examine how UQE is related to Prediction before and after the passage of SOX. We create 
a dummy variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋, which is coded one for years after 2001 and zero otherwise, 
and a dummy variable Treatment, which is coded one for a firm with board having less 
than 50% independent directors prior to 2002. Therefore, the interaction between these two 
variables, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, will capture how Prediction is related to board 
independence. We also include the same set of control variables, industry, and time fixed 
effects resulting in the following model:  
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𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1)
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑄𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡−1
+ 𝛾2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛿1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿1𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
As per our hypothesis that board independence reduces informed short selling prior 
to earnings announcements, we expect 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 to be negatively correlated 
with Prediction. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of our dependent and 
independent variables. We calculate the statistics after winsorizing the variables at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles within each calendar quarter to mitigate the impact of outliers. The 
statistics of the variables in our study are close to the statistics reported in the comparable 
studies. For example, the mean values of Size, Liquidity, and Spread are 7.77, 13.34, and 
0.03, respectively, which compare closely to 7.69, 13.39, and 0.04, the mean values of 
Firm Size, Trading Volume, and Spread, respectively, in Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012).  
Panel B shows the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients among the variables in our 
study. Our measure of abnormal short selling, ABSI, is positively correlated with 
Performance and negatively correlated with Vol, Dispersion, Liquidity, and Spread. UQE 
is positively correlated with both Performance and Liquidity and negatively correlated with 
Vol, Dispersion, and Spread. 
 
(4) 
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2.5.2 Informed Short Selling and Board Independence 
Our analysis starts with examining the relations between Prediction and 
IndependentBoards after controlling for UQE and various determinants of short selling as 
per existing literature. Therefore, we estimate equation (3) in the entire sample and present 
the results in Table 2.2. The results show that the coefficient estimate of 
IndependentBoards is negative and significant. Because IndependentBoards is a dummy 
variable coded one if independent directors constitute a majority of the board and zero 
otherwise, the above evidence suggests that short sellers’ correct prediction of the direction 
of UQE post-announcement decreases in firms with independent boards relative to firms 
with non-independent boards, providing support for our first hypothesis. The 
interpretations of the coefficient estimates in Logistic regression are not as direct as in OLS 
regression. Logistic regression models the log odds of a positive response (in this case, the 
probability of correct prediction of the movement of UQE post-announcement) as a linear 
combination of the predictor variables. Therefore, for a one unit change in one predictor 
variable, the difference in log-odds for correct prediction is expected to change by the 
respective coefficient, given the other variables in the model are held constant. The 
coefficient estimate of -0.185 of IndependentBoards indicates that the difference in log-
odds is expected to be 0.185 units lower in firms with independent boards compared to 
firms with non-independent boards, while holding the other variables constant in the 
model. We can also interpret the results in terms of odds-ratio by exponentiating the 
coefficient estimate, 𝑒−0.185 = 0.83, which means that the predicted odds of correctly 
predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement in firms with independent boards is 
0.83 times that in firms with non-independent boards. 
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2.5.3 Informed Short Selling, Board Independence, and CEO Duality 
In our second hypothesis, drawing from the evidence of existing literature that 
shareholders benefit from the monitoring by independent directors in the presence of CEO 
duality, we argue that the value of board independence in limiting informed short selling 
based on nonpublic information is more pronounced in firms with CEO duality. To 
evaluate this hypothesis, we divide our sample into two subsamples; (1) one subsample 
includes the observations with CEO duality (2) the other subsample includes the 
observations without CEO duality. We then estimate equation (3) with Logistic regression 
in the above two subsamples separately. Table 2.3 includes the results which show that the 
coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant where CEO duality 
is present and insignificant where CEO duality is absent, providing support for our second 
hypothesis. The coefficient estimate of -0.292 of IndependentBoards indicates that the 
difference in log-odds is expected to be 0.292 units lower in firms with independent boards 
compared to firms with non-independent boards, while holding the other variables constant 
in the model. In terms of odds-ratio, the exponentiated coefficient estimate, 𝑒−0.292 = 0.74, 
means that the predicted odds of correctly predicting the movement of UQE post-
announcement in firms with independent boards is 0.74 times that in firms with non-
independent boards. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of 
IndependentBoards in the subsample with CEO duality is larger than that in the entire 
sample (-0.292 versus -0.185). These results suggest that board independence is more 
effective in firms with CEO duality than in firms without CEO duality to limit informed 
short selling based on nonpublic information prior to earnings announcement. 
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2.5.4 Informed Short Selling, Board Independence, and Board Size 
In this paper, we point to the evidence in existing literature that increase in board 
size may be either beneficial or detrimental for shareholders, which implies that board size 
may either increase or decrease the value of board independence. Thus, in our third 
hypothesis we argue that the value of board independence in limiting informed short selling 
varies with board size. To evaluate this hypothesis, as before, we divide our sample into 
two subsamples; (1) one subsample includes the observations where the board size is small 
(2) the other subsample includes the observations where the board size is large. We define 
board size as small if the size of a board is less than the median board size and large 
otherwise. We estimate equation (3) with Logistic regression in the above two subsamples 
separately and report the results in Table 2.4. The results show that the coefficient estimate 
of IndependentBoards is negative and significant in firms with large boards and 
insignificant in firms with small boards, suggesting that board independence is more 
effective in large boards to limit informed short selling prior to earnings announcement. In 
the subsample of firms with large boards, the coefficient estimate of -0.343 of 
IndependentBoards indicates that the difference in log-odds is expected to be 0.343 units 
lower in firms with independent boards compared to firms with non-independent boards, 
while holding the other variables constant in the model. In terms of odds-ratio, the 
exponentiated coefficient estimate, 𝑒−0.343 = 0.71, means that the predicted odds of 
correctly predicting the movement of UQE post-announcement in firms with independent 
boards is 0.71 times that in firms with non-independent boards. Furthermore, the magnitude 
of the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards in the subsample with large boards is 
almost twice that in the entire sample (-0.343 versus -0.185). These results suggest that 
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board independence is more effective in firms with large boards to limit informed short 
selling based on nonpublic information prior to earnings announcement. 
2.5.5 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Board Independence, and Informed Short Selling 
In this section, we discuss the results of using the exogenous shock to representation 
of independent directors on corporate boards from the passage of SOX (see e.g., Linck, 
Netter, and Yang, 2008; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010) as a quasi-natural experiment to 
analyze how informed short selling is related to board indepenence. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 2.5. First, the significant positive coefficient of PostSOX, 
which is a dummy variable coded one for years after 2001 and zero otherwise, indicates that 
informed short selling generally increased during the post-SOX period. Furthermore, the 
coefficient of Treatment, which identifies the set of firms having less than 50% 
independent directors prior to 2002, is strongly significant and positive indicating that short 
sellers generally have better predictive ability in these firms controlling for various firm-
characteristics. Finally, our variable of interest is Treatment * PostSOX, an interaction term 
between Treatment and PostSOX. This variable identifies the set of firms (among the entire 
set of Treatment firms) that changed from having less than 50% independent directors in 
their boards prior to the passage of SOX to having more than 50% independent directors 
in their boards after the passage of  SOX. The strongly significant negative coefficient of 
this variable indicates that informed short selling significantly decreased in firms where 
the independent directors constituted the majority of the boards after the shock, controlling 
for various firm-characteristics that affect short selling. The coefficient estimate of -0.483 
of Treatment * PostSOX indicates that the difference in log-odds is 0.483 units lower after 
the shock. In terms of odds-ratio, the exponentiated coefficient estimate, 𝑒−0.483 = 0.62, 
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means that the predicted odds of correctly predicting the movement of UQE post-
announcement after the shock is 0.62 times that before the shock.  These results provide 
reasonable evidence for our central prediction that independent directors limit informed 
short selling prior to upcoming earnings announcements. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether and how board independence affects informed 
short selling based on nonpublic information prior to upcoming earnings announcements. 
Drawing on the evidence that independent directors are effective monitors (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; Byrd and Hickman, 1992), we 
argue that access to nonpublic information will be limited within firms having independent 
boards which will reduce informed short selling prior to upcoming earnings 
announcements. Existing literature suggests that the value of board independence may be 
more prominent in the presence of CEO duality, which leads to our second hypothesis that 
board independence is more effective in limiting informed short selling in the presence of 
CEO duality. Finally, because board size can affect the effectiveness of board’s monitoring 
activities, favorably or unfavorably, our third hypothesis posits that the value of board 
independence in limiting informed short selling varies with board size. We evaluate our 
hypotheses by examining the relations between Prediction, a measure of informed short 
selling, and IndependentBoards, a dummy variable coded one if independent directors 
constitute a majority of the board and zero otherwise. We emply Logistic model to regress 
Prediction on IndependentBoards after controlling for UQE and several control variables 
that past literature finds to be reliable determinants of short selling. The results show that 
the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant, which suggests 
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that informed short selling decreases in firms with independent boards relative to firms 
with non-independent boards, providing support for our first hypothesis. The results from 
estimating our model separately in firms with CEO duality and without CEO duality show 
that the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and significant where CEO 
duality is present and insignificant where CEO duality is absent, which supports our second 
hypothesis. Finally,  after estimating our model separately in firms with small boards and 
large boards, we find that the coefficient estimate of IndependentBoards is negative and 
significant in firms with large boards and insignificant in firms with small boards, 
suggesting that board independence is more effective in large boards to limit informed 
short selling prior to earnings announcement. Because the board of directors is determined 
endogenously, the above documented negative relationship between Prediction and 
IndependentBoards may be driven by unobservable variables affecting both short selling 
and board independence. Therefore, we perform a quasi-natural experiment relying on the 
exogenous shock to representation of independent directors on corporate boards from the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  The results show that informed short selling 
significantly decreased in firms where the independent directors constituted the majority 
of the boards after the shock.  
Our study contributes both to the governance and short selling literature. The 
findings that board independence reduces informed short selling driven by nonpublic 
information points to an important oversight role performed by the independent directors 
of the corporate board. By studying the utility of board independence in the presence of 
CEO duality and large boards, this paper helps to clarify when shareholders can expect 
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board independence to be more beneficial. Finally, by showing that short selling is sensitive 
to board independence, we contribute to a better understanding of short selling.  
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics  
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent variables and Panel B shows the Pearson’s Correlation 
Coefficients of the variables. ABSI is abnormal short interest; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; MB is market-to-book; Size 
is firm size; Performance is firm income before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume; Spread is bid-ask spread; The Appendix includes the detailed definitions of all 
these variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP. The sample period is from the calendar year 1996 to 2014 and 
contains 11,303 firm-quarter observations. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev. 25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
ABSI 0.009 -0.011 0.217 -0.109 0.097 
UQE 0.000 0.006 0.210 -0.068 0.074 
MB 3.283 2.307 59.726 1.520 3.665 
Size 7.769 7.598 1.529 6.651 8.780 
Performance 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.006 0.026 
Vol 0.024 0.021 0.012 0.016 0.029 
Dispersion 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.002 
Liquidity 13.338 13.274 1.486 12.264 14.415 
Spread 0.032 0.029 0.015 0.022 0.038 
 
Panel B: Pearson’s Correlation 
  ABSI  UQE  MB Size  Performance  Vol   Dispersion   Liquidity  
UQE -0.010                       
MB 0.000  -0.007                      
Size -0.001  0.014  -0.013                   
Performance 0.025 *** 0.374 *** -0.012 0.041 ***                
Vol -0.034 *** -0.098 *** 0.012 -0.295 *** -0.249 ***             
Dispersion -0.022 ** -0.119 *** -0.002 -0.089 *** -0.375 *** 0.396 ***         
Liquidity -0.021 ** 0.017 * 0.010 0.712 *** 0.068 *** 0.006  0.003      
Spread -0.037 *** -0.097 *** 0.012 -0.309 *** -0.270 *** 0.933 *** 0.420 *** 0.020 *** 
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Table 2.2 Informed Short Selling and Board Independence 
This table shows the results of regressing Prediction on IndependentBoards controlling for 
various determinants of short selling using Logistic analytical method. Prediction is a 
dummy variable coded one when ABSI is positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise. 
ABSI is abnormal short selling; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; IndependentBoards 
is a dummy variable coded one if independent directors constitute a majority of the board 
and zero otherwise; MB is market-to-book; Size is firm size; Performance is firm income 
before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume; Spread is bid-ask spread; AmexDummy is 
a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero 
otherwise; NasdaqDummy is a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the Nasdaq 
Stock Market, and zero otherwise. The Appendix includes the detailed definitions of all 
these variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP. The sample period is 
from the calendar year 1996 to 2014. t- Statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using the Huber–White sandwich estimator 
(clustered on firm-level identifier) and are reported in brackets. Two-sided statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Prediction 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients 
IndependentBoards -0.185 
 [-2.26]** 
UQE -5.643 
 [-17.25]*** 
MB -0.000 
 [-0.52] 
Size -0.193 
 [-4.74]*** 
Performance -6.807 
 [-4.73]*** 
Vol -9.761 
 [-1.45] 
Dispersion -12.700 
 [-0.98] 
Liquidity 0.124 
 [3.32]*** 
Spread -9.964 
 [-1.65]* 
AmexDummy -0.948 
 [-1.31] 
NasdaqDummy -0.025 
 [-0.33] 
Constant -2.189 
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 [-4.41]*** 
  
Observations 11,303 
Industry FE YES 
Quarter FE YES 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.173 
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Table 2.3 Informed Short Selling, Board Independence, and CEO Duality 
This table shows the results of regressing Prediction on IndependentBoards controlling for 
various determinants of short selling using Logistic analytical method. Prediction is a 
dummy variable coded one when ABSI is positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise. 
ABSI is abnormal short selling; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; IndependentBoards 
is a dummy variable coded one if independent directors constitute a majority of the board 
and zero otherwise; MB is market-to-book; Size is firm size; Performance is firm income 
before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume; Spread is bid-ask spread; AmexDummy is 
a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero 
otherwise; NasdaqDummy is a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the Nasdaq 
Stock Market, and zero otherwise. CEO duality exists when the titles of both the CEO and 
the Chairman of the Board are assigned to the same individual. The Appendix includes the 
detailed definitions of all these variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP. 
The sample period is from the calendar year 1996 to 2014. t- Statistics are based on 
standard errors adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using the Huber–
White sandwich estimator (clustered on firm-level identifier) and are reported in brackets. 
Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Prediction 
Explanatory Coefficients 
Variables With CEO Duality Without CEO Duality 
IndependentBoards -0.292 0.012 
 [-2.82]*** [0.08] 
UQE -5.868 -5.431 
 [-13.79]*** [-11.59]*** 
MB -0.000 -0.002 
 [-0.41] [-0.91] 
Size -0.188 -0.169 
 [-3.48]*** [-2.67]*** 
Performance -3.565 -10.353 
 [-1.55] [-5.27]*** 
Vol -7.863 -15.680 
 [-0.89] [-1.51] 
Dispersion 3.772 -30.501 
 [0.23] [-1.66]* 
Liquidity 0.080 0.168 
 [1.59] [3.02]*** 
Spread -14.756 -3.479 
 [-1.77]* [-0.39] 
AmexDummy -0.323  
 [-0.50]  
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NasdaqDummy 0.097 -0.148 
 [0.91] [-1.36] 
Constant -1.507 -1.675 
 [-2.60]*** [-2.55]** 
   
Observations 6,639 4,592 
Industry FE YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.182 0.182 
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Table 2.4   Informed Short Selling, Board Independence, and Board Size 
This table shows the results of regressing Prediction on IndependentBoards controlling for 
various determinants of short selling using Logistic analytical method. Prediction is a 
dummy variable coded one when ABSI is positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise. 
ABSI is abnormal short selling; UQE is unexpected quarterly earnings; IndependentBoards 
is a dummy variable coded one if independent directors constitute a majority of the board 
and zero otherwise; MB is market-to-book; Size is firm size; Performance is firm income 
before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume; Spread is bid-ask spread; AmexDummy is 
a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero 
otherwise; NasdaqDummy is a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed on the Nasdaq 
Stock Market, and zero otherwise. Firms are considered to have small boards if their board 
size is less than the sample median board size of nine members, otherwise they are 
considered to have large boards. The Appendix includes the detailed definitions of all these 
variables. The sources of the data are Compustat and CRSP. The sample period is from the 
calendar year 1996 to 2014. t- Statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity using the Huber–White sandwich estimator (clustered 
on firm-level identifier) and are reported in brackets. Two-sided statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Prediction 
Explanatory Coefficients 
Variables Small Board Large Board 
IndependentBoards -0.042 -0.343 
 [-0.34] [-2.94]*** 
UQE -6.201 -5.531 
 [-13.44]*** [-13.32]*** 
MB -0.001 0.005 
 [-1.24] [2.71]*** 
Size -0.238 -0.201 
 [-3.49]*** [-3.56]*** 
Performance -5.726 -8.522 
 [-2.91]*** [-4.04]*** 
Vol 0.103 -17.465 
 [0.01] [-1.75]* 
Dispersion -21.863 -10.887 
 [-1.23] [-0.56] 
Liquidity 0.124 0.133 
 [2.20]** [2.51]** 
Spread -14.779 -5.039 
 [-1.67]* [-0.57] 
AmexDummy  -0.654 
  [-0.89] 
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NasdaqDummy 0.064 -0.126 
 [0.58] [-1.16] 
Constant -1.795 -2.341 
 [-2.44]** [-3.64]*** 
   
Observations 4,413 6,849 
Industry FE YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.184 0.184 
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Table 2.5 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Board Independence, and Informed Short Selling 
This table reports the results of the quasi-natural experiment with Logistic analytical 
method using the exogenous shock in board independence from the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Prediction is a dummy variable coded one when ABSI 
is positive and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise. ABSI is abnormal short selling; UQE 
is unexpected quarterly earnings;  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑂𝑋 is a dummy variable coded one for years after 
2001 and zero otherwise;  Treatment is a dummy variable coded one for a firm with board 
having less than 50% independent directors prior to 2002; MB is market-to-book; Size is 
firm size; Performance is firm income before extraordinary items; Vol is stock return 
volatility; Dispersion is dispersion in analysts’ forecasts; Liquidity is trading volume; 
Spread is bid-ask spread; AmexDummy is a dummy variable coded one for a stock listed 
on the American Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise; NasdaqDummy is a dummy variable 
coded one for a stock listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market, and zero otherwise. The sample 
period is from the calendar year 1996 to 2014 and contains 5,345 firm-quarter observations. 
t- Statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity using the Huber–White sandwich estimator (clustered on firm-level 
identifier) and are reported in brackets. Two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Prediction 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients 
UQE -5.370 
 [-10.96]*** 
Treatment x PostSOX -0.483 
 [-2.73]*** 
Treatment 0.509 
 [3.64]*** 
PostSOX 0.836 
 [1.67]* 
Size -0.147 
 [-2.02]** 
Performance -13.382 
 [-4.53]*** 
Vol -17.158 
 [-1.66]* 
Dispersion -19.620 
 [-0.77] 
Liquidity 0.052 
 [0.67] 
Spread 1.412 
 [0.15] 
AmexDummy -0.730 
 [-1.13] 
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NasdaqDummy 0.470 
 [0.72] 
Constant -0.594 
 [-0.96] 
  
Observations 5,340 
Industry FE YES 
Quarter FE YES 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.185 
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CHAPTER 3: SHORT POSITIONS AND INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS  
3.1 Introduction  
Prior studies document that short sellers are generally successful in identifying 
securities that underperform the market (e.g., Seneca, 1967; Figlewski, 1981; Senchack 
and Starks, 1993; Asquith and Muelbrook, 1996; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and 
Balachandran, 2002; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009). Some of these studies focus on 
informed short selling around quarterly earnings announcement and find pre-
announcement short selling to be significantly related to post-announcement returns (e.g., 
Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004; Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao, 2012; Fang, Huang, and 
Karpoff, 2016).  In this paper, drawing on the above evidence of informed short selling 
around earnings announcement, we provide a methodology that examines pre-
announcement short selling and provides specific “Sell” recommendations ahead of 
earnings announcement. Thus, our study provides an important decision support tool to be 
used in conjunction with the traditional investment recommendations of financial analysts. 
Recent studies suggest that following sell-side financial analysts’ recommendations blindly 
can be costly for investors as these recommendations can be affected by the economic 
incentives of these analysts in recommending certain stocks including “growth” stocks, etc. 
(e.g., Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee, 2004). However, the investment 
recommendations coming from short selling does not suffer from this potential conflict of 
interest as short sellers undertake significant risk in short selling by investing their own 
capital (e.g., Drake, Rees, and Swanson, 2011). Furthermore, Drake, Rees, and Swanson 
(2011) show that when short sellers and financial analysts disagree in their prediction of 
future returns, investing following the short sellers is the most profitable investment 
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strategy. Therefore, our study makes a significant contribution by providing a framework 
that supports informed decision making. 
Our methodology involves examining the short selling of a firm at a point of time 
closest to its day of quarterly earnings announcements. Following the convention in the 
short selling literature (e.g., Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001; Asquith, 
Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Henry, Kisgen, and Wu, 2011; Grullon, 
Michenaud, and Weston, 2015), we divide a firm’s monthly/bi-monthly short interest (SI)10 
by its total shares outstanding to proxy for short selling. We form quintile portfolios based 
on SI on the SI publication date11and make “Sell” recommendations for firms in the quintile 
with the highest SI. We evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology by examining the 
raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted “Sell” portfolios over a long range of 
holding periods, namely from the one-day holding period to the 30-day holding period, 
from the day immediately after the earnings announcement. The results show that raw, 
excess, and abnormal returns are highly significant up to the 22-day holding period. 
Furthermore, the returns are larger negative for longer holding periods. For example, the 
one-day and 14-day holding period raw returns are -0.24% and -0.45%, excess returns are 
-0.25% and -0.54%, and abnormal returns are -0.14% and -0.48%, respectively. These 
returns are economically significant considering the “Sell” portfolios are formed on every 
SI publication date which occurs at a frequency of two every month since September 2007. 
                                                          
10 Short interest is the quantity of firm shares that investors have sold short but not yet covered or closed out. 
 
11 Section 4. Methodology discusses the timeline of short interest data and defines SI publication date which 
accounts for the lag between a firm’s reporting of short interest data and publication of the data upon 
compilation. 
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Therefore, focusing on the 14-day holding period, the holding period up to which all returns 
seem to decrease (that is, the returns become larger negative) as the holding period 
increases, the annualized simple raw returns and abnormal returns are -10.80% and -
11.52%. We compute the returns by multiplying the 14-day holding period returns by 24 
as there are 24 SI publication dates in a year which mean “Sell” portfolios can also be 
formed 24 times in a year. We evaluate the robustness of our results though subsample 
analysis which shows that the results are very significant and consistent for the most recent 
time in the sample, specifically, from 2010 to 2015, which points to the relevance of our 
methodology. 
3.2 Literature Review 
  During the last several years, financial researchers have conducted a critical review 
of the value addition from the analysts’ recommendations. Although past studies document 
that analysts’ recommendations help price discovery process of financial securities, the 
recent empirical evidence on the value of analysts’ recommendation is mixed. For example, 
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) find that directly following analysts’ 
recommendations can be costly as these recommendations are often biased towards 
“glamour” (i.e., positive momentum, high growth, high volume, and relatively expensive) 
stocks and are not aligned with the expected direction between these variables and future 
returns. Lin and McNichols (1998) and Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) attribute this 
less than optimal recommendations to the conflict of interest financial analysts face in their 
profession. Subsequently, some studies sought after alternative, and hopefully, less-biased, 
public sources of information to support investment decision making. For example, Drake, 
Rees, and Swanson (2011) compare the investment value from analysts’ recommendations 
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with that from short interest. These researchers find that short interest is significantly 
associated in the expected direction with all 11 predictive variables they examine whereas 
analysts’ recommendations often violate the expected direction for several variables. 
Furthermore, a portfolio of stocks in which short sellers and analysts conflict in their 
opinions about future returns can earn high abnormal returns if investors follow the short 
sellers.   
There is ample empirical evidence that short sellers are informed traders. 
Specifically, past studies document evidence that short sellers are able to identify 
overvalued firms (e.g., Seneca, 1967; Figlewski, 1981; Senchack and Starks, 1993; Asquith 
and Muelbrook, 1996; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 2002) and 
contribute to price discovery in the financial markets (e.g., Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu, 
2007; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Boehmer and Wu, 2013; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 
2011). Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that short sellers appear to take advantage of 
short-term overreaction in stock prices. Other studies examine short sellers’ ability in 
timing specific corporate events, e.g., quarterly earnings announcement. Christophe, Ferri, 
and Angel (2004) examine short selling prior to earnings announcements of Nasdaq-listed 
firms and show that the pre-announcement short selling mostly appears to reflect firm-
specific information rather than fundamental financial characteristics of firms. 
Given substantial past evidence that SI contains valuable information with respect 
to future returns, the increased availability of SI data creates a good opportunity for 
investors to analyze the short interest data to obtain valuable price-related information and 
invest in a more informed manner. However, the process of obtaining SI data, analyzing 
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them, understanding the right investment signals, etc., to be able to invest in a more 
profitable manner is a very involved and time-consuming one. Moreover, although there 
are a lot of studies that suggest trading strategies based on short selling data, these studies 
do not provide concise, simplified, and objective investment recommendations for 
investors to follow easily, such as following the analysts’ “Buy”, “Sell”, and other similar 
recommendations. In this paper, we attempt to provide a methodology to analyze SI data 
and come up with investment recommendations such as analysts’ recommendations.  
Investors pay attention to analyst recommendations prior to making their 
investment decisions. However, these recommendations are often biased and yield less than 
optimal results. The major contribution of this paper is to provide a less biased opinion on 
future price movement based on short sellers’ trades. We expect our study to initiate similar 
research in the future to enrich our understanding of short interest data. 
3.3 Data  
For our analysis, we use monthly/bi-monthly SI data from Compustat and market 
data including price, returns, trading volume, etc., from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). We also obtain the earnings announcement dates from Compustat. For our 
sample creation, we go as far back as possible. However, SI data in Compustat are available 
only since 1973, and therefore, our initial sample spans from 1973 to 2015. We limit our 
analysis to domestic common stock (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) listed on NYSE, Amex, 
and Nasdaq resulting in a sample of 235,417 monthly or bimonthly observations. Table 3.1 
shows the distribution of quarterly earning announcements into months. We count the 
number of announcements in each month of each year and then compute the time series 
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average. The results show that the announcements happen each month; however, most of 
the announcements happen in February, May, August, and November. 
We evaluate the robustness of our analysis after excluding financial services firms 
(SIC codes 6000–6999), regulated utility firms (SIC codes 4900–4999), and the financial 
crisis period spanning from 2008 to 2009. 
3.4 Methodology 
Our methodology involves examining the short position of a firm at a point of time 
closest to its day of quarterly earnings announcements. Prior to September 2007, SI data 
are available only once in a month; as of settlement on the 15th of each month, or the 
preceding business day if the 15th is not a business day. However, from September 2007, 
SI data are available also as of settlement on the last business day of the month. 
Furthermore, it takes a10-14 additional business days form the reporting settlement date to 
publish the SI data. Therefore, in our methodology, we identify the set of firms which have 
quarterly earnings announcement within the next 15 calendar days after SI data are 
published, SI publication date, to conduct our analysis and provide investment 
recommendations based on the short selling data available immediately before an earnings 
announcement. We form quintile portfolios based on SI on the SI publication date and make 
“Sell” recommendations for the firms in the quintile with the highest SI. 
We evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology by examining the raw returns, 
excess returns, and abnormal returns (Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010) of equal-
weighted “Sell” portfolios. Past studies examine returns over various holding periods in 
evaluating the information content in SI in predicting future returns: two-day (Anderson, 
Reeb, and Zhao, 2012), three-day (Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice, 2009), and 
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one-month (Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan, 2010). In our study, we evaluate the post-
announcement returns for a long range of holding periods, namely from one-day holding 
period to 30-day holding period, from the day immediately after the earnings 
announcement. 
We compute the raw and excess returns of the equal-weighted portfolio consisting 
of the firms having “Sell” recommendations ahead of earnings announcements from our 
methodology on each SI publication date (once every month for months prior to September 
2007 and twice every month since September 2007). Then we aggregate the time series of 
the equal-weighted returns and compute the time series average. In case of abnormal 
returns, we perform Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of the following four-
factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997): 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡 
where 𝛼𝑝captures the abnormal returns, 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the realized market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 
is the excess return of a portfolio of small stocks over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is 
the excess return of a portfolio of high book-to-market-value stocks over a portfolio of low 
book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡is the excess return on the prior-period winners 
portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio. We estimate a separate cross-sectional 
regression for each calendar year and calculate time series average of the abnormal returns. 
3.5 Results 
Table 3.2 shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns for one-day to 30-day 
holding period returns of the equal-weighted “Sell” portfolios. The results show that all 
returns are highly significant up to the 22-day holding period, whereas abnormal returns 
(1) 
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are significant up to the 30-day holding period. Furthermore, we see larger negative raw, 
excess, and abnormal returns as the holding period increases up to the 14-day holding 
period. More specifically, the one-day and 14-day holding period raw returns are -0.24% 
and -0.45%, excess returns are -0.25% and -0.54%, and abnormal returns are -0.14% and -
0.48%, respectively. This pattern is more persistent in case of abnormal returns where 
returns generally continue to decrease (become larger negative) up to the 30-day holding 
period reaching to -0.67%. These returns are economically highly significant considering 
the “Sell” portfolios are formed every SI publication date which occurs at a frequency of 
two every month since September 2007. Therefore, if we focus on the 14-day holding 
period, the holding period up to which all returns seem to decrease (that is, the returns 
become larger negative) as the holding period increases, the annualized simple raw returns 
and abnormal returns are -10.78% and -11.4%. We compute the returns by multiplying the 
14-day holding period returns by 24, as there are 24 SI publication dates in a year which 
means “Sell” portfolios can also be formed 24 times in a year.    
 To further evaluate the merit of the “Sell” recommendations based on SI, we 
perform subsample analysis. Fig. 1 plots the time series of the annual mean SI which 
reveals an increasing trend during the sample period. For example, SI has increased from 
0.29% in 1973 to 4.64% in 2015. However, SI increased dramatically from 2000 to 2007 
when it reached 6.31% before dropping dramatically again. Therefore, for our subsample 
analysis, we divide the entire sample into three subsamples; the first subsample spans from 
1973 to 1999, the second subsample spans from 2000 to 2007, and the third subsample 
spans from 2008 to 2015. Furthermore, we exclude financial services firms (SIC codes 
6000 to 6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4999). 
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Table 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 show the raw, excess, and abnormal returns for one-day to 
30-day holding periods of the equal-weighted “Sell” portfolios for the subsamples of 1973 
to 1999, 2000 to 2007, and 2008 to 2015, respectively. In case of the first subsample, from 
1973 to 1999, the results are not thoroughly consistent. For example, although both raw 
and excess returns are significant for the one-day to the three-day holding period, these 
results are positive contrary to our expectation of negative returns. Moreover, abnormal 
returns are not significant for any of these holding periods. Furthermore, both raw and 
abnormal returns are significant for the five-day to the 11-day holding period. However, 
raw returns are positive, whereas abnormal returns are negative. Except for the 9-day 
holding period, excess returns are not significant for these holding periods. 
In case of the second subsample, from 2000 to 2007, we see the similar 
inconsistency in results. For example, Table 3.4 shows that although both raw and excess 
returns are significant for each of the holding periods from the one-day to the 21-day 
holding period, abnormal returns are significant only for one-day, five-day, seven-day, and 
sixteen-day holding periods. 
However, turning to the final subsample which covers the most recent time of our 
sample, from 2008 to 2015, we see very supportive results for the “Sell” recommendations. 
For example, Table 3.5, which reports the results of this subsample, shows that except for 
the eight-day holding period, raw, excess, and abnormal returns are highly significant for 
each of the holding periods from one-day to 12-day holding periods. Therefore, these 
results suggest that our methodology works best for the most recent time in the sample. 
The results from the final subsample, from 2008 to 2015, provides good support for 
the methodology in the paper. However, this subsample also includes the financial crisis 
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period which raises concerns about the applicability of our methodology during a normal 
period. Therefore, we need to evaluate if the results from the final subsample are driven by 
the financial crisis period. To verify the validity of this concern, we exclude 2008 to 2009 
from the final subsample and perform our analysis, the results of which are presented in 
Table 3.6. The results show that all returns, raw, excess, and abnormal, are significant for 
each of the holding periods from the one-day to the 15-day holding period. Therefore, 
exclusion of the financial crisis period, in fact, strengthens the results and provides strong 
support for our methodology. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we draw on the well documented evidence of informed short selling 
around quarterly earnings announcement, design a methodology that examines the pre-
announcement short selling, and provide specific “Sell” recommendations for firms ahead 
of their earnings announcements. In our methodology, we examine the short position of a 
firm at a point of time closest to its day of quarterly earnings announcements. More 
specifically, each month we identify the set of firms having the highest SI prior to their 
quarterly earnings announcement and make a “Sell” recommendations for these firms. We 
evaluate the merit of our methodology by examining the post-announcement raw, excess, 
and abnormal returns of the equal-weighted portfolios consisting of firms having the “Sell” 
recommendations. We form portfolios for one-day to 30-day holding periods. The initial 
results show that all returns are highly significant up to the 22-day holding period, whereas 
abnormal returns are significant up to the 30-day holding period. We evaluate the 
robustness of our results through subsample analysis which shows that the results are very 
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significant and consistent for the most recent time in our sample, specifically, from 2010 
to 2015, which points to the relevance of our methodology. 
Investors and other market participants heavily rely on the investment 
recommendations of financial analysts. However, recent studies suggest that sell-side 
financial analysts’ recommendations can be biased because of conflict of interest, etc. Our 
study focuses on short sellers who are considered informed investors and who do not suffer 
from a conflict of interests such as financial analysts’ and thus provide an alternative source 
of information. Investors can take into consideration the “Sell” recommendations of our 
methodology along with the traditional investment recommendations of financial analysts. 
Therefore, our study makes a significant contribution in helping investors make informed 
investment decisions. 
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Figure 3.1 Time-series of mean short interest 
This Figure shows the time-series of mean short interest (SI). We compute monthly cross-
sectional mean SI which is then used to compute annual mean SI. The sample period is 
from the fiscal year 1973 to 2015. 
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Table 3.1 Monthly Distribution of Quarterly Earnings Announcement 
Table 1 shows the distribution of quarterly earnings announcements into calendar months. 
The number of announcements is computed in each month of each year and the time series 
average is reported. The sample period is from the fiscal year 1973 to 2015. 
Month No. of Announcements % Announcements 
January 290 5.41 
February 661 12.35 
March 400 7.48 
April 475 8.88 
May 769 14.36 
June 103 1.92 
July 498 9.31 
August 713 13.33 
September 102 1.91 
October 513 9.59 
November 705 13.17 
December 121 2.26 
All 5,350 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
72 
 
Table 3.2 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (1973 to 2015) 
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios 
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from 
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated following 
Fama and MacBeth (1973): 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑝𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks 
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-to-
market-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡is the 
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio. 
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 1973 to 2015. Two-sided statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The 
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West 
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors. 
Days 
Raw Returns Excess Returns Abnormal Returns 
Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   
1 -0.238 -24.12 *** -0.247 -25.08 *** -0.138 -2.26 ** 
2 -0.228 -17.1 *** -0.243 -18.29 *** -0.130 -1.82 * 
3 -0.225 -15.57 *** -0.243 -16.83 *** -0.208 -3.14 *** 
4 -0.284 -17.21 *** -0.306 -18.6 *** -0.292 -4.71 *** 
5 -0.312 -17.08 *** -0.340 -18.65 *** -0.329 -4.38 *** 
6 -0.326 -15.06 *** -0.362 -16.75 *** -0.326 -3.78 *** 
7 -0.316 -12.46 *** -0.361 -14.25 *** -0.359 -4.17 *** 
8 -0.317 -10.97 *** -0.370 -12.81 *** -0.385 -4.68 *** 
9 -0.328 -10.35 *** -0.387 -12.2 *** -0.390 -4.56 *** 
10 -0.374 -10.98 *** -0.437 -12.83 *** -0.425 -4.84 *** 
11 -0.386 -10.86 *** -0.453 -12.78 *** -0.452 -5.01 *** 
12 -0.376 -10.08 *** -0.449 -12.05 *** -0.443 -4.42 *** 
13 -0.403 -10.11 *** -0.484 -12.14 *** -0.463 -4.98 *** 
14 -0.449 -10.68 *** -0.538 -12.82 *** -0.475 -5.35 *** 
15 -0.415 -9.32 *** -0.513 -11.52 *** -0.483 -4.89 *** 
16 -0.355 -7.66 *** -0.458 -9.88 *** -0.504 -4.89 *** 
17 -0.310 -6.55 *** -0.417 -8.8 *** -0.531 -4.95 *** 
18 -0.310 -6.48 *** -0.421 -8.82 *** -0.545 -5.17 *** 
19 -0.299 -6.22 *** -0.416 -8.66 *** -0.561 -5.58 *** 
20 -0.281 -5.72 *** -0.406 -8.25 *** -0.560 -5.56 *** 
21 -0.247 -4.82 *** -0.380 -7.42 *** -0.591 -5.85 *** 
22 -0.176 -3.32 *** -0.317 -5.98 *** -0.602 -5.51 *** 
23 -0.095 -1.75 * -0.241 -4.45 *** -0.612 -5.25 *** 
(1) 
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24 -0.073 -1.31  -0.223 -4.03 *** -0.549 -4.94 *** 
25 -0.090 -1.61  -0.245 -4.38 *** -0.526 -4.54 *** 
26 -0.097 -1.72 * -0.257 -4.57 *** -0.534 -4.26 *** 
27 -0.073 -1.29  -0.241 -4.26 *** -0.543 -4.25 *** 
28 -0.042 -0.72  -0.219 -3.76 *** -0.637 -5.27 *** 
29 0.059 0.99  -0.126 -2.11 ** -0.673 -4.92 *** 
30 0.116 1.92 * -0.074 -1.22  -0.667 -5.43 *** 
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Table 3.3 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (1973 to 1999) 
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios 
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from 
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated following 
Fama and MacBeth (1973): 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks 
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-to-
market-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡is the 
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio. 
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 1973 to 1999. Two-sided statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The 
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West 
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors. 
Days 
Raw Returns Excess Returns Abnormal Returns 
Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   
1 0.150 7.58 *** 0.125 6.31 *** -0.006 -0.12  
2 0.284 10.37 *** 0.241 8.8 *** 0.018 0.26  
3 0.274 9.75 *** 0.225 8.01 *** -0.057 -0.96  
4 0.199 6.21 *** 0.136 4.26 *** -0.153 -2.21 ** 
5 0.127 3.37 *** 0.049 1.3  -0.203 -2.28 ** 
6 0.158 3.6 *** 0.059 1.35  -0.190 -1.81 * 
7 0.158 3.17 *** 0.034 0.68  -0.267 -2.5 ** 
8 0.193 3.56 *** 0.049 0.9  -0.335 -2.89 *** 
9 0.261 4.43 *** 0.102 1.73 * -0.329 -2.75 ** 
10 0.202 3.2 *** 0.030 0.47  -0.383 -3.21 *** 
11 0.162 2.42 ** -0.024 -0.36  -0.403 -3.2 *** 
12 0.109 1.5  -0.092 -1.27  -0.393 -2.77 ** 
13 0.059 0.76  -0.163 -2.08 ** -0.408 -3.1 *** 
14 0.029 0.35  -0.218 -2.62 *** -0.440 -3.19 *** 
15 0.066 0.75  -0.201 -2.29 ** -0.471 -3.11 *** 
16 0.120 1.31  -0.161 -1.76 * -0.494 -3.19 *** 
17 0.135 1.43  -0.159 -1.68 * -0.556 -3.55 *** 
18 0.098 1  -0.210 -2.14 ** -0.563 -3.9 *** 
19 0.062 0.61  -0.261 -2.57 ** -0.565 -4.11 *** 
20 0.079 0.74  -0.264 -2.47 ** -0.561 -4.35 *** 
21 0.157 1.39  -0.210 -1.86 * -0.600 -4.53 *** 
22 0.241 2.05 ** -0.146 -1.24  -0.597 -3.91 *** 
23 0.325 2.7 *** -0.076 -0.63  -0.629 -4.17 *** 
24 0.368 2.99 *** -0.046 -0.37  -0.591 -3.87 *** 
(1) 
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25 0.373 2.97 *** -0.054 -0.43  -0.566 -3.54 *** 
26 0.397 3.1 *** -0.045 -0.35  -0.545 -3.08 *** 
27 0.381 2.91 *** -0.081 -0.62  -0.503 -2.69 ** 
28 0.422 3.13 *** -0.065 -0.49  -0.563 -3.3 *** 
29 0.500 3.62 *** -0.007 -0.05  -0.590 -3.07 *** 
30 0.535 3.85 *** 0.013 0.09  -0.596 -3.54 *** 
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Table 3.4 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (2000 to 2007) 
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios 
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from 
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated following 
Fama and MacBeth (1973): 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks 
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-to-
market-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡is the 
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio. 
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 2000 to 2007. Two-sided statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The 
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West 
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors. 
Days 
Raw Returns Excess Returns Abnormal Returns 
Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   
1 -0.441 -22.38 *** -0.455 -23.07 *** -0.370 -2.96 ** 
2 -0.537 -22.02 *** -0.559 -22.93 *** -0.221 -1.28  
3 -0.623 -23.28 *** -0.650 -24.29 *** -0.113 -0.36  
4 -0.768 -24.59 *** -0.802 -25.65 *** -0.195 -0.61  
5 -0.828 -24.45 *** -0.870 -25.66 *** -0.708 -5.6 *** 
6 -0.854 -23.53 *** -0.908 -24.98 *** 2.238 0.86  
7 -0.822 -19.45 *** -0.889 -21.01 *** -0.937 -3.05 ** 
8 -0.803 -16.49 *** -0.883 -18.09 *** 0.905 0.68  
9 -0.807 -15.27 *** -0.895 -16.9 *** 0.927 0.66  
10 -0.865 -15.32 *** -0.959 -16.95 *** 0.323 0.37  
11 -0.906 -15.42 *** -1.006 -17.09 *** -2.235 -1.58  
12 -0.860 -13.82 *** -0.969 -15.53 *** -52.037 -1.11  
13 -0.771 -11.25 *** -0.891 -12.97 *** 1.426 0.7  
14 -0.679 -9.12 *** -0.812 -10.87 *** 3.141 0.89  
15 -0.578 -7.35 *** -0.723 -9.17 *** 3.530 0.9  
16 -0.457 -5.6 *** -0.610 -7.45 *** -1.777 -1.91 * 
17 -0.409 -4.94 *** -0.568 -6.84 *** 12.843 1.04  
18 -0.426 -4.99 *** -0.591 -6.9 *** 0.616 0.47  
19 -0.408 -4.65 *** -0.582 -6.59 *** 0.658 0.48  
20 -0.372 -4.03 *** -0.556 -6 *** 1.511 0.69  
21 -0.292 -3.11 *** -0.490 -5.18 *** -7.659 -1.25  
22 -0.052 -0.54  -0.261 -2.73 *** -8.100 -1.24  
23 0.149 1.57  -0.068 -0.71  -4.329 -1.39  
24 0.256 2.66 *** 0.034 0.35  -49.075 -1.12  
(1) 
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25 0.269 2.74 *** 0.040 0.41  -
129.165 
-1.11  
26 0.248 2.47 ** 0.011 0.11  2.573 0.83  
27 0.309 3 *** 0.061 0.59  3.167 0.85  
28 0.318 2.98 *** 0.057 0.53  9.910 0.99  
29 0.407 3.72 *** 0.134 1.21  -1.924 -2.82 ** 
30 0.463 4.17 *** 0.181 1.62  3.660 0.83  
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Table 3.5 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (2008 to 2015) 
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios 
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from 
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated following 
Fama and MacBeth (1973): 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks 
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-to-
market-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡is the 
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio. 
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 2008 to 2015. Two-sided statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The 
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West 
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors. 
Days 
Raw Returns Excess Returns Abnormal Returns 
Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   
1 -0.352 -19.94 *** -0.353 -20 *** -0.464 -6.56 *** 
2 -0.346 -14.86 *** -0.348 -14.93 *** -0.336 -3.86 *** 
3 -0.288 -11.36 *** -0.290 -11.44 *** -0.317 -3.02 ** 
4 -0.277 -9.79 *** -0.280 -9.88 *** -0.298 -2.15 * 
5 -0.286 -9.16 *** -0.290 -9.26 *** -0.460 -7.31 *** 
6 -0.330 -8.73 *** -0.334 -8.84 *** -0.714 -3.02 ** 
7 -0.323 -7.22 *** -0.328 -7.34 *** -0.536 -4.46 *** 
8 -0.340 -6.65 *** -0.347 -6.77 *** -0.251 -1.37  
9 -0.378 -6.72 *** -0.385 -6.84 *** -0.493 -3.67 *** 
10 -0.413 -6.82 *** -0.420 -6.94 *** -0.361 -3.11 ** 
11 -0.398 -6.4 *** -0.406 -6.52 *** -0.483 -3.94 *** 
12 -0.362 -5.58 *** -0.370 -5.7 *** -0.475 -3.55 *** 
13 -0.450 -6.5 *** -0.459 -6.63 *** -0.153 -0.72  
14 -0.565 -7.79 *** -0.575 -7.93 *** -0.107 -0.44  
15 -0.568 -7.47 *** -0.579 -7.61 *** -0.718 -1.82  
16 -0.518 -6.57 *** -0.530 -6.72 *** 0.169 0.43  
17 -0.465 -5.75 *** -0.477 -5.9 *** -0.134 -1.35  
18 -0.441 -5.49 *** -0.453 -5.64 *** 0.111 0.37  
19 -0.392 -4.92 *** -0.405 -5.09 *** -0.110 -1.03  
20 -0.365 -4.54 *** -0.379 -4.71 *** -0.119 -1.03  
21 -0.328 -3.9 *** -0.343 -4.07 *** -0.614 -1.68  
22 -0.304 -3.48 *** -0.320 -3.66 *** -0.592 -1.75  
23 -0.251 -2.81 *** -0.267 -2.99 *** -0.705 -1.54  
24 -0.275 -3 *** -0.292 -3.19 *** -0.189 -1.62  
(1) 
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25 -0.333 -3.63 *** -0.351 -3.82 *** 0.257 0.57  
26 -0.308 -3.38 *** -0.326 -3.58 *** 0.368 0.6  
27 -0.240 -2.66 *** -0.259 -2.86 *** -0.435 -2.85 ** 
28 -0.178 -1.91 * -0.198 -2.12 ** -1.259 -1.74  
29 -0.055 -0.57  -0.075 -0.79  -0.997 -2.13 * 
30 -0.002 -0.02  -0.023 -0.23  -1.117 -1.94 * 
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Table 3.6 Returns of “Sell” Portfolios (2010 to 2015) 
This table shows the raw, excess, and abnormal returns of equal-weighted portfolios 
consisting of firms with “Sell” recommendations. Abnormal returns are the intercept from 
the four-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) estimated 
following Fama and MacBeth (1973): 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑝1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 is market risk premium; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is excess return of a portfolio of small stocks 
over a portfolio of big stocks; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the excess return of a portfolio of high book-to-
market-value stocks over a portfolio of low book-to-market-value stocks; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡is the 
excess return on the prior-period winners portfolio over the prior-period losers portfolio. 
The data for the factor portfolio returns are from Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). The sample period is from the fiscal year 2010 to 2015. Two-sided statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated as ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. The 
significance level for the mean is based on t-statistics calculated with Newey-West 
autocorrelation-adjusted (3-lags) standard errors. 
Days 
Raw Returns Excess Returns Abnormal Returns 
Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   Returns t-stat   
1 -0.449 -23.43 *** -0.449 -23.44 *** -0.449 -10.56 *** 
2 -0.466 -18.81 *** -0.466 -18.82 *** -0.449 -6.73 *** 
3 -0.443 -17.05 *** -0.443 -17.06 *** -0.442 -6.97 *** 
4 -0.452 -15.91 *** -0.453 -15.93 *** -0.482 -5.28 *** 
5 -0.485 -15.59 *** -0.485 -15.61 *** -0.521 -4.52 *** 
6 -0.529 -14.68 *** -0.530 -14.7 *** -0.523 -3.68 ** 
7 -0.568 -13.39 *** -0.568 -13.41 *** -0.501 -3.24 ** 
8 -0.586 -11.92 *** -0.587 -11.94 *** -0.462 -2.57 ** 
9 -0.620 -11.45 *** -0.622 -11.47 *** -0.449 -2.43 * 
10 -0.675 -11.61 *** -0.676 -11.62 *** -0.459 -2.61 ** 
11 -0.619 -10.37 *** -0.621 -10.39 *** -0.456 -2.56 * 
12 -0.609 -10.07 *** -0.610 -10.1 *** -0.434 -2.36 * 
13 -0.671 -10.76 *** -0.673 -10.78 *** -0.418 -2.3 * 
14 -0.818 -12.32 *** -0.819 -12.34 *** -0.421 -2.97 ** 
15 -0.822 -11.65 *** -0.824 -11.67 *** -0.351 -2.25 * 
16 -0.786 -10.58 *** -0.788 -10.61 *** -0.307 -1.84  
17 -0.717 -9.37 *** -0.719 -9.39 *** -0.242 -1.51  
18 -0.701 -9.04 *** -0.704 -9.07 *** -0.255 -1.66  
19 -0.683 -8.72 *** -0.686 -8.75 *** -0.241 -1.79  
20 -0.655 -8.27 *** -0.657 -8.29 *** -0.248 -1.59  
21 -0.675 -8.22 *** -0.678 -8.25 *** -0.268 -1.79  
22 -0.668 -7.87 *** -0.670 -7.9 *** -0.252 -1.6  
23 -0.616 -7.15 *** -0.619 -7.18 *** -0.230 -1.32  
24 -0.653 -7.5 *** -0.656 -7.53 *** -0.252 -1.47  
(1) 
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25 -0.687 -7.89 *** -0.690 -7.92 *** -0.243 -1.64  
26 -0.718 -8.36 *** -0.721 -8.39 *** -0.335 -1.74  
27 -0.695 -8.23 *** -0.698 -8.26 *** -0.382 -1.83  
28 -0.699 -8.13 *** -0.702 -8.17 *** -0.524 -2.51 * 
29 -0.618 -7.05 *** -0.622 -7.09 *** -0.541 -2.51 * 
30 -0.591 -6.62 *** -0.594 -6.65 *** -0.542 -2.57 ** 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definitions 
Book Equity (BE) Total assets – [total liabilities + preferred stock] + 
deferred taxes + convertible debt. 
Market Equity (ME) Common shares outstanding x price. 
Book Leverage (BL) [Short-term + long-term debt]/[Total Assets] 
Market Leverage (ML) [Short-term + long-term debt]/[Total Assets – Book 
Equity + Market Equity] 
Property, Plant & Equipment 
(PPE) 
Net property, plant, and equipment/total assets. 
Profitability (EBITD) Earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation/total 
assets. 
Research and Development 
Expenses (R&D) 
Research and development expense/sales. 
Selling Expenses (SE) Selling expense/sales. 
Firm Size (Size) Natural logarithm of net sales. 
Abnormal Short Interest (ABSI) Pre-announcement short interest divided by non-
announcement short interest, all minus 1: 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1) =
𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−5 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−1)
𝑆𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−62 𝑡𝑜 𝑡−6)
− 1 
where t indicates the date of earnings announcement 
for the firm i.  
Market-to-book (MB) The product of shares outstanding and price divided 
by the book value of total common equity, all at the 
end of each quarter. 
Dispersion The standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided 
by the previous quarter-end stock price. 
Performance Prior quarter-end income before extraordinary items 
divided by prior quarter-end total assets. 
Liquidity The natural log of daily trading volume averaged 
across each quarter. 
Spread The daily bid price less daily ask price, divided by the 
average of the bid price plus the ask price, averaged 
across each quarter. 
Vol The standard deviation of daily stock returns for each 
quarter. 
AmexDummy A dummy variable coded one for a firm listed on the 
American Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. 
NasdaqDummy A dummy variable coded one for a firm listed on the 
Nasdaq Stock Market (SM), and zero otherwise. 
Unexpected quarterly earnings 
(UQE) 
It is defined as the residual from the following 
regression: 
(2) 
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𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−4
+ 𝛽3𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑞−8 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑞 
where i indexes firms; EPS is actual earnings per 
share of the announcement quarter (q), the prior 
quarter (q-1), one year ago (q-4), and two years ago 
(q-8).  
Prediction A dummy variable coded one when ABSI is positive 
and UQE is negative, and zero otherwise. 
IndependentBoards It is dummy variable coded one if independent 
directors constitute a majority of the board and zero 
otherwise. 
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